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I. INTRODUCTION 
Current litigation challenging the constitutionality of Article X, 
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Section 25 of the Florida Constitution, entitled “Patients’ Right to Know 
About Adverse Medical Incidents” and more commonly known as 
Amendment 7 (“Amendment 7”), will have a significant practical impact 
on patient care and medical peer review in Florida.1  Legally, 
Amendment 7 contributed to the need for a federal statutory peer review 
privilege, which Congress recognized by enacting the Patient Safety and 
Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (“PSQIA”).2  Now, in addition to the 
PSQIA, some federal courts appear ready to consider an expanded 
common law privilege.3  This comment addresses the current 
applicability of Amendment 7 in the wake of the PSQIA and the 
foundation that has been set to undo Amendment 7, and establish an 
expanded common law privilege in the name of promoting patient safety 
and encouraging meaningful medical peer review.4 
This comment lays the foundation to evaluate the sustainability of 
Amendment 7 post-PSQIA in Part II by first examining medical peer 
review, its origin, its evolution and why peer review remains important 
to patient safety.5  Although many physicians dislike peer review,6 
 
 1.  Amendment 7 was passed by a vote of 81.2 % in favor and 18.8 % against.  November 2, 
2004 General Election: Official Results, FLA. DEP’T OF STATE, DIV. OF ELECTIONS, 
http://election.dos.state.fl.us/elections/resultsarchive/ (select “2004 General” election from 
dropdown menu; then select “Const. Amendments” from dropdown menu) (last visited Mar. 2, 
2013) (cited in Florida Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478 n.1 (Fla. 2008)).  
Amendment 7’s proposed statement and purpose was presented as follows: 
The Legislature has enacted provisions relating to a patient’s bill of rights and 
responsibilities, including provisions relating to information about practitioners’ 
qualifications, treatment and financial aspects of patient care.  The Legislature has, 
however, restricted public access to information concerning a particular health care 
provider’s or facility’s investigations, incidents or history of acts, neglects, or defaults 
that have injured patients or had the potential to injure patients.  This information may be 
important to a patient.  The purpose of this amendment is to create a constitutional right 
for a patient or potential patient to know and have access to records of a health care 
facility’s or provider’s adverse medical incidents, including medical malpractice and 
other acts which have caused or have the potential to cause injury or death.  This right to 
know is to be balanced against an individual patient’s rights to privacy and dignity, so 
that the information available relates to the practitioner or facility as opposed to 
individuals who may have been or are patients.   
Advisory Op. re: Patients’ Right to Know About Adverse Med. Incidents, 880 So. 2d 617, 618 (Fla. 
2004).   
 2.  Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (“PSQIA”), Pub. L. No. 109-41, 
119 Stat. 424 (2005) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-21 to -26 (2006)).  The stated 
purpose of the PSQIA was: “[t]o amend title IX of the Public Health Service Act to provide for the 
improvement of patient safety and to reduce the incidence of events that adversely effect patient 
safety.”  PSQIA 
 3.  See cases discussed infra notes 159-167.  
 4.  See infra notes 136-143, 169-179 and accompanying text. 
 5.  See infra notes 15-29 and accompanying text. 
 6.  See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text. 
2
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Congress has acknowledged its importance by making peer review 
mandatory and by providing the statutory protections to ensure peer 
review remains meaningful.7  States have followed suit, passing their 
own laws that provide for the protection of peer review materials.8  Part 
II also addresses how Amendment 7 reversed Florida’s historical 
approach providing broad peer review protection and how this erosion of 
peer review protection served as a foundation for the federal statutory 
protections provided by the PSQIA.9 
Part III, the Statement of the Issue, describes the losing arguments 
that hospitals10 attempted to employ to protect against Amendment 7 
requests, and why, in lieu of a new PSQIA argument, Amendment 7 is 
ripe for new round of litigation.11  Part IV provides an overview of 
PSQIA’s framework and explains how the practical implementation of 
the PSQIA’s statutory protection limits Amendment 7.12  Furthermore, 
this analysis section explores the likelihood of a common law medical 
peer review privilege, and why the trend in federal courts and the 
analytical framework applied by the United States Supreme Court 
suggests an expanded common law peer review privilege may become a 
reality.13  In closing, this comment discusses why the benefits of an 
expanded medical peer review privilege outweigh the risks, and 
identifies current Florida litigation that may undo Amendment 7 and 
completely restore meaningful peer review in Florida.14 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Medical Peer Review & its Role Improving Patient Care 
The beginning of medical peer review dates back to 1918 when the 
American College of Surgeons (“ACS”) established the first peer review 
program in the United States as a review body charged with improving 
the quality of patient care.15  The ACS ultimately evolved into the Joint 
 
 7.  See infra notes 54-62, 110-117 and accompanying text. 
 8.  See infra notes 50-51, 175 and accompanying text. 
 9.  See infra notes 63-93 and accompanying text. 
 10.  While the term “hospital” is used throughout this comment, the PSQIA and peer review 
discussion within applies broadly to any healthcare organization or healthcare facility. 
 11.  See infra notes 94-123 and accompanying text. 
 12.  See infra notes 123-143 and accompanying text. 
 13.  See infra notes 145-166 and accompanying text. 
 14.  See infra notes 180-191 and accompanying text. 
 15.  Alissa Marie Bassler, Federal Law Should Keep Pace with States and Recognize a 
Medical Peer Review Privilege, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 689, 691 (2003).  This first program, known as 
the Hospital Accreditation Program, was formed with the intent to improve the quality of hospital 
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Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations 
(“JCAHO”),16 which requires hospitals and healthcare organizations to 
conduct peer review of staff members in order to receive JCAHO’s 
accreditation.17 
Peer review is a process in which the actions of health care 
providers are reviewed to determine the appropriateness of care that was 
provided.18  Peer review is predominately performed by physicians and 
other health care professionals who are members of a hospital’s medical 
staff.19  The medical staff members are selected by hospital leadership 
 
care.  Id.  
 16.  The Joint Commission is a national non-profit accrediting body and standards-setting 
organization for health care providers.  Frederick Levy, Darren Mareniss, Corianne Iacovelli & 
Jeffrey Howard, The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, 31 J. OF LEGAL MED. 4: 
397, 406 (2010).  JCAHO has been in operation since 1951 and is governed by a Board of 
Commissioners that is composed of health care professionals, policy experts, ethicists, and 
stakeholders’ representatives.  Facts about The Joint Commission, THE JOINT COMMISSION (Jan. 3, 
2013), http://www.jointcommission.org/facts_about_the_joint_commission/.  JCAHO’s primary 
function is to audit and accredit hospitals, hospice services, nursing homes, rehabilitation centers, 
and laboratories to ensure compliance with regulatory standards.  Id. 
 17.  George E. Newton II, Maintaining the Balance: Reconciling the Social and Judicial 
Costs of Medical Peer Review Protection, 52 ALA. L. REV. 723, 725 (2001).  JCAHO is considered 
the foremost hospital accreditation authority and participation plays a critical role in the economic 
sustainability of a hospital because eligibility for federal funds, such as Medicare, depends on 
successfully achieving accreditation.  See Murray G. Sagsveen & Jennifer L. Thompson, The 
Evolution of Medical Peer Review in North Dakota, 73 N.D. L. REV. 477, 478 n.6 (1997); Talia 
Storch, Note and Comment, Medical Peer Review in Florida: Is the Privilege Under Attack?, 32 
NOVA L. REV. 269, 273 (2007); 42 C.F.R. § 482.22 (2011). 
 18.  Eric Scott Bell, Comment, Make Way: Why Arkansas and the States Should Narrow 
Health Care Peer Review Privileges for the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005, 62 
ARK. L. REV. 745, 749 (2009).  For example, hospitals often review specific care to determine 
appropriate treatment, correctness of billing, quality assurance and utilization of care.  Id. at 749-
750.  Peer review committees participate in intra-committee discussion focused on evaluating the 
specific and general performance of the hospital in an effort to identify, isolate and remedy 
incidents of medical error.  Id.  There are three premises that underline traditional peer review:  
The first premise is that due to their unique and specialized training, only physicians can 
properly evaluate and judge other physicians’ medical practices and detect when 
colleagues pose a risk to patient care.  The second premise is that a milieu supporting 
candid communication is most likely to foster recognition of both exemplary and 
substandard care.  The third premise is that peer review participants are motivated to 
maintain high standards of care in their group or institution and act in good faith.   
Ilene N. Moore, et al., Rethinking Peer Review: Detecting and Addressing Medical Malpractice 
Claims Risk, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1175, 1177 (2006). 
 19.  As an example, Lee Memorial Hospital, part of Lee Memorial Health System, defines the 
term “medical staff” in its Medical Staff Bylaws as “those practitioners who are authorized by the 
Board to exercise privileges at one or more of the System’s hospitals, and, on a component basis, 
those practitioners who are authorized by the Board to exercise privileges at a particular system 
hospital.”  Lee Memorial Hospital Medical Staff Bylaws, LEE MEM’L HEALTH SYS. 6 (June 16, 
2011), http://www.leememorial.org/physicianpub/pdf/BYLAWS/LMHBYLAWS06-16-11.pdf.  The 
Bylaws go onto describe the nature of medical staff membership as:  
4
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and organized as a peer review committee.20  This committee is tasked to 
both review the qualifications and training of new applicants as well as 
to critique the services rendered by physicians already practicing at the 
hospital.21  Functionally, peer review leads to efficient evaluation 
because practicing physicians have the expertise to evaluate peers’ work 
and are best positioned to review the competence of other practicing 
physicians they regularly observe.22 
Peer review is important to improving health care quality because 
of the role it plays in identifying best practices and reducing medical 
error.23  Historically, civil medical malpractice claims were the 
cornerstone vehicle used to regulate patient safety in the United States.24  
 
[A] privilege that shall be extended only to professionally competent physicians (M.D. 
or D.O.), dentists, podiatrists and/or psychologists who continuously meet the 
qualifications, standards, and requirements set forth in these Bylaws . . .  Medical Staff 
membership is a privilege and not a right of any practitioner or other person.  Medical 
Staff membership and the exercise of privileges in connection therewith shall be 
extended only to practitioners who continuously meet the requirements of these Bylaws.   
Id. at 7. 
 20.  Susan O. Scheutzow & Sylvia Lynn Gillis, Confidentiality and Privilege of Peer Review 
Information: More Imagined than Real, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 169, 173 (1992/1993).  Since the 
hospital’s board and administration is generally made up of individuals without the qualifications to 
evaluate medical care, evaluation and review tasks are delegated to members of the medical staff.  
Id. at 173-174.  Ultimately, however, the hospital’s board is responsible for any harm or risk of 
injury to patients.  Ronald G. Spaeth, Kelly C. Pickering & Shannon M. Webb, Quality Assurance 
and Hospital Structure: How the Physician-Hospital Relationship Affects Quality Measures, 12 
ANNALS HEALTH L. 235, 237 (2003).  Because hospitals believe the level of quality care depends on 
effective peer review, governing boards work diligently to eliminate the barriers to effective peer 
review.  Id.  
 21.  Newton, supra note 17, at 725.  In order to ensure impartiality, committee members are 
generally composed of unbiased practicing physicians who are not in direct competition with the 
physician under review.  Id.  Although ultimate decisions on any disciplinary actions taken against 
the reviewed physician are made by the hospital’s governing board, the peer review committee 
makes a recommendation that is highly influential.  Id.  For initial applicants, the process involves 
the review of the applicant’s training and overall clinical experience; a review process referred to as 
credentialing because it is based primarily on the physicians’ credentials, such as training, 
certification and demonstrated ability.  Susan O. Scheutzow, State Medical Peer Review: High Cost 
But No Benefit – Is it Time for a Change?, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 14 (1999). 
 22.  Newton, supra note 17, at 724.  The peer review system, along with state licensing board 
disciplinary action and the medical malpractice system, serve as the three primary tools to monitor 
the quality of care provided by physicians.  Id.  Despite the existence of alternatives, peer review is 
widely accepted as the primary means to weed out low quality physicians and identify physicians 
whose skills require improvement.  Scheutzow, supra note 21, at, 14-15. 
 23.  See Patricia A. Sullivan & Jon M. Anderson, The Health Care Debate: If Lack of Tort 
Reform is Part of the Problem, Federalized Protection for Peer Review Needs to be Part of the 
Solution, 15 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 41 (2010).  Unlike the tort system, peer review is capable 
of “maximizing efficient health care outcomes.”  Id. at 46. 
 24.  Levy, Mareniss, Iacovelli & Howard, supra note 16, at 400.  The primary purpose of 
medical malpractice cases is to assign financial responsibility for the harm caused; however, this 
retroactive approach focusing on a single incident does little to address systematic problems of the 
5
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Civil medical malpractice, however, fails to accomplish many patient-
focused goals because it only addresses negligent care that actually 
causes damage; thus care that falls below quality standards but does not 
cause damage goes unaddressed.25  Peer review protects future patients 
from medical error by ensuring that affiliated practitioners practice 
properly and have the qualifications, training and experience necessary 
to provide quality care.26  When peer review committees engage in 
meaningful peer review, the process accomplishes three important 
purposes: (1) it leads to higher quality health care by rooting out 
incompetence and error; (2) it reassures patients that they are receiving 
quality care; and (3) it leads to a reduction in health care costs by 
allowing hospitals to self-regulate and increase efficiencies.27  Achieving 
these important purposes requires more than just peer review for peer 
review’s sake—it requires that peer review is meaningful and effective 
at uncovering and remedying substandard care.28  Consequently, 
meaningful peer review requires candid communication between 
committee members that detects and identifies both exemplary and 
substandard care, and motivates all medical staff members to maintain 
excellent skills and professional standards.29 
B. Why Many Physicians Dislike Peer Review 
Overall, peer review is considered a public good.30  It offers 
incentives for similarly trained physicians working in the same hospital 
to identify colleagues with knowledge gaps or skill deficiencies, 
 
health care industry and fails to prevent future errors.  Id. 
 25.  Id.  The author argues for a more proactive approach to regulating patient safety in the 
United States, primarily through the mechanism of peer review.  Id. 
 26.  Id. (citing Lisa M. Nijm, Pitfalls of Peer Review: The Limited Protections of State and 
Federal Peer Review Law for Physicians, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 541, 543 (2003)).  Hospitals and 
advocacy groups often characterize peer review as a risk management tool because of its aim to 
reduce medical errors.  Levy, Mareniss, Iacovelli & Howard, supra note 16, at 401.   
 27.  Bassler, supra note 15, at 691-692.  “When hospital conditions and patient care improve 
and the rates of death and disease decline, the number of medical malpractice lawsuits should 
decline.  Peer review thus seeks to identify and eliminate these systematic ‘accidents waiting to 
happen,’ thereby maximizing efficient health care outcomes.”  Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23, 
at 46 (citing Pastore v. Samson, 900 A.2d 1067, 1074-76 (R.I. 2006); Bryan A. Liang & LiLan Ren, 
Medical Liability Insurance and Damage Caps: Getting Beyond Band Aids to Substantive Systems 
Treatment to Improve Quality and Safety in Healthcare, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 501, 530 (2004)). 
 28.  Brief of the Idaho Hosp. Ass’ns as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Montalbano 
v. Saint Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 264 P.3d 944 (Idaho 2011) No. 37573-2010, 2010 WL 
5497832, at *8 (discussing why peer review merely for the sake of compliance with Joint 
Commission standards is not the goal). 
 29.  Bell, supra note 18, at 753.   
 30.  Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23, at 51. 
6
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facilitate their improvement, and monitor progress and future 
performance.31  Regardless of its many benefits, not all physicians are 
enamored with peer review.32  First, peer review committee members are 
often direct colleagues or friends with the reviewed physician and 
understand that a disciplinary recommendation that leads to a 
termination of clinical privileges may have a devastating effect on the 
reviewed physician’s career, while also ending any friendship.33  
Second, committee members may be reluctant to participate in the peer 
review process because they do not want their evaluations and appraisals 
of a fellow physician’s competence later disclosed.34  Third, committee 
members may have concerns over retaliation in the form of a lawsuit 
against the peer review committee.35  Finally, peer review may be time 
consuming and lead to less billable time or loss of referrals.36  Thus, in 
the face of abounding disincentives, physicians are often reluctant to 
voluntarily participate in the peer review process, and when they do 
there is little incentive to participate aggressively and meaningfully.37  In 
recognition of the need for meaningful peer review, state and federal 
 
 31.  Storch, supra note 17, at 278.  This internal committee is generally preferred to external 
parties assuming review responsibility because when serious problems are identified, the hospital 
can take proactive steps to limit the doctor’s further interaction with patients before government 
agencies get involved.  Id. 
 32.  Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23, at 50.  One of the reasons physicians dislike peer 
review is because fundamentally peer review entails acknowledging error and doctors are not 
supposed to make mistakes, let alone admit and apologize for them.  Id.  
 33.  Christopher S. Morter, Note, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Will 
Physicians Find Peer Review More Inviting?, 74 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1118 (1988).  The negative 
repercussions that follow a substandard review may have lasting effects that include, but are not 
limited to, damaged reputation, loss of income, patients and malpractice insurance, the stigma 
associated with a negative review and potential difficulty finding future employment elsewhere.  
Storch, supra note 17, at 275. 
 34.  Scheutzow, supra note 21, at 18.  Especially in cases where the reviewing physician 
knows or considers the reviewed physician a friend, the reviewing physician may only be willing to 
testify as part of a confidential peer review process where the testimony will not be revealed during 
a malpractice or other legal action.  Id. 
 35.  Some physician’s disciplined through the peer review process have brought successful 
suits against peer review participants and the hospital under an antitrust theory, arguing the peer 
review activity was undertaken to decrease the number of competing physician’s in the reviewing 
physician’s practice area.  Spaeth, Pickering & Webb, supra note 20, at 241 (citing Patrick v. 
Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 105 (1988) (finding that peer review activities were not protected from 
application of federal antitrust laws where a surgeon alleged violations of the Sherman Act against 
reviewing physicians)).   
 36.  Morter, supra note 33, at 1140.  
 37.  Newton, supra note 17, at 727.  Weighing against the disincentives discussed within this 
paragraph are the possible ethical concerns for quality of patient care or concerns for reputation and 
accreditation status of a reviewer’s hospital that may motivate a physician’s voluntary involvement 
in the peer review process.  Id. at 726. 
7
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immunity, confidentiality and privilege protections must work together 
to facilitate the existence of a functional peer review system.38 
C. Peer Review Immunity, Confidentiality & Privilege 
Federal and state laws generally grant protection to the peer review 
process in one or more of three ways: (1) providing immunity from 
lawsuits to peer review committee members; (2) requiring individuals 
participating in peer review to keep information about the process and 
conclusions confidential; and (3) making peer review information 
privileged.39  Immunity is an exemption from liability against a suit 
brought by a plaintiff.40  “Congress and practically every state legislature 
have enacted statutes that immunize those persons participating in the 
peer review process.”41 
Confidentiality protection focuses on the obligation to refrain from 
disclosing information to third parties outside of the judicial process.42  
 
 38.  See id. at 735.   
 39.  Scheutzow, supra note 21, at 9. 
 40.  Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23, at 55 (citing St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. 
v. McWhirter, 229 U.S. 265, 287 (1913)).  Because immunity deprives a plaintiff of a potential 
remedy, courts typically construe immunity provisions narrowly.  Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 
23, at 55 (citing Weissman v. Nat’l Ass’n of Secs. Dealers, Inc., 500 F.3d 1293, 1297 (11th Cir. 
2007)). 
 41.  Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23, at 55.  Specifically, the Health Care Quality 
Improvement Act immunity provided by Congress is a qualified immunity and does not extend to 
other forms of relief.  Id. at 52.  The Health Care Quality Improvement Act will be discussed in 
greater detail later in this comment.  See infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.  For language 
from state immunity statutes, see, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.251 (West 2012) (“No 
individual who is a member of or works for or on behalf of a peer review committee of a health care 
entity shall be liable in damages to any person for any acts, omissions, decisions, or other conduct 
within the scope of the functions of the peer review committee.”); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-21-2-6 
(West 2011) (“The governing board and the governing board’s employees, agents, consultants, and 
attorneys have absolute immunity from civil liability for communications, discussions, actions 
taken, and reports made concerning disciplinary action or investigation taken or contemplated if the 
reports or actions are made in good faith and without malice.”); MINN. STAT. § 145.63 (West 2012). 
(“No review organization and no person who is a member [of] . . . a review organization shall be 
liable for damages or other relief in any action brought by a person or persons whose activities have 
been or are being scrutinized or reviewed by a review organization . . . .”). 
 42.  Scheutzow, supra note 21, at 35.  Confidentiality may be imposed by law or contract; 
thus, from a practical perspective, all hospitals should contractually require that peer review 
participants keep peer review information confidential.  Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 20, at 196-
197.  Furthermore, hospital bylaws should require medical staff members participating in peer 
review to keep all information confidential and as part of the appointment process to any peer 
review committee, the hospital should require that each participant sign an agreement to keep the 
information confidential.  Id. at 196.  “This gives rise to a contractual claim for breach of contract 
should any participant breach the confidentiality and voluntarily testify or divulge peer review 
information.”  Id.   
8
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To achieve meaningful peer review, confidentiality is a must: 
Confidentiality is essential to the proper functioning of peer review.  
First, confidentiality promotes the candid, free flow of information 
between physicians who are part of the peer review committee.  
Second, and probably most importantly to the physicians on the 
committee, confidentiality protects reviewing members of the 
committee from being forced to disclose documents and statements 
made during the peer review process if they are later sued by the 
physicians they review.43 
Confidentiality concerns impact peer review participants’ willingness to 
participate meaningfully in the peer review process, thus lack, or any 
perceived lack, of confidentiality may lead to the obliteration of 
meaningful peer review.44  Historically, Florida courts had repeatedly 
articulated the significance of confidentiality to peer review and 
improved healthcare quality, going as far as stating that lack of 
confidentiality will terminate meaningful peer review.45 
Lastly, privilege protection is the right to keep information from 
being used as evidence.46  Generally, privilege ascribed to peer review 
 
 43.  Bassler, supra note 15, at 703-704.  Commentators have stated that voluntary disclosure 
of peer review findings may be particularly damaging to the process.  Scheutzow & Gillis, supra 
note 20, at 192.  See, e.g., West Covina Hosp. v. Superior Court, 718 P.2d 119 (Cal. 1986) (holding 
California’s privilege statute did not prohibit a peer review participant from voluntarily testifying as 
to the proceedings reasoning).  “Obviously, interpretations such as West Covina would render 
absolutely meaningless any corresponding peer review privilege protection that exists as physicians 
would always be concerned that one of the participants would choose voluntarily to disclose the 
proceedings.”  Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 20, at 191.  See also, e.g., Babcock v. Bridgeport 
Hosp., 742 A.2d 322, 344 (Conn. 1999) (quoting Claypool v. Mladineo, 724 So. 2d 373, 388 (Miss. 
1998) (“Only where . . . peer review committees . . . are assured of confidentiality [will they] feel 
free to enter into uninhibited discussions of their peers.”)); Young v. Western Pa. Hosp., 722 A.2d 
153, 156 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (“The need for confidentiality in the peer review process stems from 
the need for comprehensive, honest, and sometimes critical evaluations of medical providers by 
their peers in the profession.”); Sun Health Corp. v. Myers, 70 P.3d 444, 447 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) 
(“The confidentiality of peer review committee proceedings is essential to achieve complete 
investigation and review of medical care.”); Konrady v. Oesterling, 149 F.R.D. 592, 597 (“The 
theory is that a confidential environment will encourage physician candor and participation in the 
process.  This, the theory goes, will result in better doctors and ultimately better health care.”). 
 44.  Morter, supra note 33, at 1130-1131.   
 45.  James C. Sawran & Robert C. Weill, Amendment 7: Will the Patient’s Right to Know 
Come at Too High a Price?,  24 No. 2 TRIAL ADVOC. Q. 7, 9 (2005).  “Confidentiality is essential 
to . . . [medical review committee] meetings; and these meetings are essential to the continued 
improvement in the care and treatment of patients . . . .  To subject these discussions and 
deliberations to the discovery process, without a showing of exceptional necessity, would result in 
terminating such deliberations.”  Id. (citing Dade County Med. Ass’n v. Hlis, 372 So. 2d 117, 120 
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1979)). 
 46.  Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 20, at 179.  “The recognition of a privilege with respect 
to communications between parties or with respect to an institution’s self-examination of its 
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has been a legislative creation utilized to achieve open and effective peer 
review.47  Thus, this privilege is institutional in nature, created not to aid 
the individual peer review participants, but to protect the institution of 
peer review, and indirectly the public who rely on peer review to 
increase the quality of healthcare.48  Said another way, if peer review 
privilege is compromised, the net result will lessen efforts to improve 
healthcare and the patient outcomes will suffer as a result.49  In 
recognition of the need for meaningful peer review and the importance 
of privilege protection, “all fifty states and the District of Columbia have 
created an evidentiary privilege for peer review information.”50 
However, despite this near universal recognition of peer review 
privilege, the scope of privileges granted by the states varies.51  
Therefore, physicians may have to speculate about the scope of the 
applicable statutory privilege, thus discouraging aggressive and 
meaningful peer review participation.52  To achieve meaningful and 
effective peer review, protections must be consistent, a principle 
recognized by Congress and the United States Supreme Court.53 
 
activities represents ‘an exception to the general liability of every person to give testimony upon all 
facts inquired in a court of justice.’”  Id. 
 47.  Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 20, at 181.  The primary justification for privilege is that 
protecting peer review participants from having to testify against reviewed physicians promotes 
candor during peer review proceedings. B. Abbott Goldberg, The Peer Review Privilege: A Law in 
Search of a Valid Policy, 10 AM. J.L. & MED. 151, 154 (1984). 
 48.  Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 20, at 181 (“Clearly the peer review privilege was created 
to encourage peer review and thus protect the institutions performing peer review and not to protect 
the individuals who were subject to review.”). 
 49.  Brief of the Idaho Hosp. Ass’ns as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 
28, at *13-14 (citing Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250 (D.D.C. 1970) (concluding the 
value of the peer review process would be destroyed if the meetings and the names of those 
participating were to be opened to the discovery process)). 
 50.  Brief of the Idaho Hosp. Ass’ns as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 
28, at *8 (citing KD v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 2d 587, 594 (D. Del. 2010) (citing Ghazal 
Sharifi, Is the Door Open or Closed? Evaluating the Future of the Federal Medical Peer-Review 
Privilege, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 561, 564 (2009)). 
 51.  Scheutzow & Gillis, supra note 20, at 188.  As one author opined, peer review laws are: 
[A] crazy quilt of statutes that pertain to a variety of committees and afford often 
incomplete or incomprehensible protection to committee members and/or staff, 
witnesses, documents, spectators, and so forth, but are seldom clear with respect to the 
exact nature of the protection that is provided to whom, what, or under what 
circumstances. 
Morter, supra note 33, at 1132.   
 52.  Morter, supra note 33, at 1137.  In contrast, the author argues that the application of peer 
review privilege in a consistent manner will encourage meaningful and effective peer review.  Id.   
 53.  See Brief of the Idaho Hosp. Ass’ns as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra 
note 28, at *20.  The Brief acknowledges that privileges are generally only effective when 
individuals whose communications are being protected know, at the time of communication, that the 
communication will be kept private.  Id.  “The United States Supreme Court, among others, has 
10
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D. Congress Responds with HCQIA 
Prior to the healthcare reform initiatives and importance placed on 
peer review discussed herein, Congress recognized the importance of 
peer review by requiring that hospitals participating in Medicare 
implement peer review programs.54  Also, Congress statutorily provided 
peer review protections of medical programs offered by the Department 
of Defense and the Department of Veteran Affairs.55  In 1986, 
attempting to extend state peer review immunities on a federal level, 
Congress passed the federal Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 
1986 (“HCQIA”).56 
In short, the HCQIA drafters felt that by improving the peer review 
process, the quality of healthcare across the country would improve.57  
 
recognized this principle, stating that if the purpose of a privilege is to be served, ‘the participants in 
the confidential conversation must be able to predict with some degree of certainty whether 
particular discussions will be protected.’”  Id. (quoting Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) 
(discussing the expansion of the psychotherapist-patient privilege).  
 54.  See Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23, at 51.  This recognition originally manifested 
itself pursuant to Congress’ spending power, when Congress mandated that hospitals have peer 
review programs to participate in Medicare.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320c-3(a) (West 2013).   
 55.  See Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23, at 51-52.  Congress has afforded peer review 
protection for medical programs offered by the Department of Defense and the Department of 
Veteran Affairs.  See 10 U.S.C.A. § 1102(a) (West 2013) (“Medical quality assurance records 
created by the Department of Defense as part of a medical quality assurance program are 
confidential and privileged.”).  See also 38 U.S.C.A. § 5705(a) (West 2013) (“Records and 
documents created by the Department [of Veteran Affairs] as part of a medical assurance 
program . . . are confidential and privileged [absent an exception].”).   
 56.  42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11101-11152 (West 2013).  The HCQIA was an attempt to address the 
national health care quality assurance problem that was resulting from local peer review 
committees’ inability to report medical error findings because of the confidentiality requirement of 
state peer review statutes.  Newton, supra note 17, at 732.  “Consequently, a physician whose 
privileges were revoked could simply relocate with little fear of having his or her previous 
incompetence discovered.  Additionally, hospitals were often willing to accept the voluntary 
resignation of incompetent physicians in exchange for silence regarding the events leading up to the 
resignation.”  Id.  Responding to this problem, the HCQIA established a framework requiring 
notification to the National Practitioner Data Bank (“NPDB”) when a hospital board’s decision 
adversely affects a physician’s privileges for longer than thirty days.  Id.  The reporting 
requirements are a mandatory provision of the HCQIA and failure to comply may result in the loss 
of HCQIA immunity.  Id. 
 57.   42 U.S.C.A. § 11101.  The statute provides an overview of the HCQIA by stating that:  
Congress finds the following: (1) The increasing occurrence of medical malpractice and 
the need to improve the quality of medical care have become nationwide problems that 
warrant greater efforts than those that can be undertaken by any individual State; 
(2) There is a national need to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to move from 
State to State without disclosure or discovery of the physician’s previous damaging or 
incompetent performance; (3) This nationwide problem can be remedied through 
effective professional peer review; (4) The threat of private money damage liability 
under Federal laws, including treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law, 
unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in effective professional peer 
11
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Congress believed it could improve the peer review process by providing 
further protection to physicians serving in review capacities by assuring 
immunity from civil litigation.58  The HCQIA was designed to shield 
participants in professional review actions by providing immunity from 
liability so long as the appropriate procedural requirements were met.59  
Under the HCQIA, the immunity afforded is qualified; requiring that the 
peer review activity has been conducted: 
(1) in the reasonable belief that the action was in furtherance of quality 
of care (2) after a reasonable effort to obtain the facts of the matter (3) 
after adequate notice and hearing procedures are afforded to the 
physician involved or after such other procedures as are fair to the 
physician under the circumstances, and (4) in the reasonable belief that 
the action was warranted by the facts known after such reasonable 
effort to obtain facts.60 
 
review; and (5) There is an overriding national need to provide incentive and protection 
for physicians engaging in effective professional peer review. 
Id.  “Under this bill, hospitals and physicians that conduct peer review will be protected from 
damages in suits by physicians who lose their hospital privileges, provided the peer review actions 
meet the due process and other standards established in the bill.”  H.R. REP. NO. 99-903, at 2 
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6384, 6385.  Hospitals and physicians that discipline 
doctors are required to report these disciplinary actions to the state medical boards, who will 
forward this information to the Department of Health and Human Services.  Id.  The bill further 
requires hospitals to query the NPDB before hiring doctors or other licensed health care 
practitioners.  Id. 
 58.  Christina A. Graham, Comment, Hide and Seek: Discovery in the Context of the State 
and Federal Peer Review Privileges, 30 CUMB. L. REV. 111, 113 (1999-2000) (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 
11101 (West 1995)). 
 59.  Lu Ann Trevino, The Health Care Quality Improvement Act: Sword or Shield?, 22 T. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 315, 331 (1997).  “Peer reviewers who improperly use the process lose their 
immunity from liability and discovery.”  Id. at 328.  “Congress meant to prevent peer review 
committees from using their power and immunity as swords against innocent practitioners.” Id. 
(citing Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991) (finding that a hospital boycott of a 
physician and publication of false disciplinary actions were restraint of trade); Patrick v. Burget, 
486 U.S. 94 (1988) (holding that state-action doctrine did not protect Oregon physicians from 
federal antitrust liability for their activities on hospital peer review committee actions)). 
 60.  42 U.S.C.A. §§ 11112(a)(1)-(4).  The statute goes onto say that “a professional review 
action shall be presumed to have met the preceding standards necessary for the protection set out in 
section 11111(a) of this title unless the presumption is rebutted by a preponderance of the 
evidence.”  Id.  Some critics claim the existence of immunity for peer review activities is 
unnecessary to protect hospitals from damage arising from negligent peer review suits: 
According to these critics, if Congress were to repeal the HCQIA tomorrow, and all the 
state legislatures were to follow suit, hospitals would still have the oft-cited incentive of 
improving patient care as an impetus to continuing their peer review activities.  The flaw 
in that argument is that the cost of those improvements would increase dramatically, and 
as the price went up, less health care would be available.  To the extent that physicians 
declined to participate in peer review activities, hospitals could easily rectify that 
problem by indemnifying them or procuring insurance.  In doing so, the cost of peer 
12
Akron Law Review, Vol. 46 [2013], Iss. 3, Art. 6
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol46/iss3/6
VOL. 46, NO. 3 - ARTICLE 6 - SORG (DO NOT DELETE) 6/17/2013  3:03 PM 
2013] MEANINGFUL PEER REVIEW 811 
Ultimately, while the HCQIA provided the individual peer review 
committee members immunity from damages liability, it did not extend 
necessary protections to peer review documents and activities.61  Thus, 
as discussed herein, Florida hospitals relying on the HCQIA to protect 
peer review documents found that Congress did not provide such 
protection in the HCQIA.62 
E. Medical Peer Review in Florida 
Prior to Amendment 7, Florida statutes provided expansive peer 
review protection.63  Florida restricted patients’ access to information 
regarding adverse medical incidents through a collection of statutes that 
provided hospitals great latitude to regulate themselves through private 
action.64  Often cited Florida case law states that these statutes were 
enacted to control the escalating cost of health care by encouraging self-
regulation by the medical profession through peer review and 
evaluation.65  As the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged, “[t]he 
privilege afforded to peer review committees is intended to prohibit the 
chilling effect of the potential public disclosure of statements made to or 
information prepared for and used by the committee in carrying out its 
peer review function.”66  The Florida legislature made meaningful peer 
 
review would be borne by hospitals, not patients.  Even if that were true, however, the 
issue would be whether the total cost to society still increased. 
Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23, at 58. 
 61.  See, e.g., West Florida Reg’l Med.Ctr., Inc. v. See, 18 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 1d D.C.A. 2009) 
(holding that Congress did not provide for confidentiality or privilege of peer review records or 
communications, but did provide peer review participants with immunity from liability).   
 62.  See infra notes 94-105 and accompanying text. 
 63.  Graham, supra note 58, at 125. 
 64.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §395.0193(7) (West 2013) and §766.101(5) (West 2013) 
(establishing confidentiality of proceedings and reports in peer review proceedings); FLA. STAT. 
§395.0191(8) (West 2013) (granting immunity from discovery to investigations, records, and 
reports regarding credentialing); FLA. STAT. §395.0193 (West 2013) and §766.101(5) (West 2013) 
(granting immunity from discovery to peer review investigations, records, and reports); FLA. STAT. 
§395.0197(6)(c) and (7) (West 2013) (providing confidentiality and privilege protection for annual 
risk management reports of adverse incidents); FLA. STAT. §766.1016(2) (West 2013) (“Patient 
safety data shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil or 
administrative action.”); FLA. STAT. §395.0193(8) (West 2013) (providing testimonial and 
discovery immunity for investigations, proceedings, and records of the peer review body); FLA. 
STAT. §395.0193(1) (West 2013) (granting immunity from retaliatory tort suits to physicians 
participating in the peer review process in good faith). 
 65.  Cruger v. Love, 599 So. 2d 111, 113 (1992) (citing Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219-20 
(1984) (interpreting former section 768.40(4), Florida Statutes, the predecessor to section 766.101)). 
 66.  Cruger, 599 So.2d at 114-115.  Expanding on the reasons stated above for why many 
physicians dislike peer review, the Cruger court stated that this chilling effect is attributable to 
several factors; specifically, doctors are reluctant to engage in peer review because they fear “loss of 
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review possible by providing a guarantee of confidentiality for the peer 
review process, most explicitly in Florida Statute, Section 766.101(5).67  
Florida courts, relying on the collection of statutes referenced above, 
consistently upheld a liberal interpretation of Florida’s peer review 
confidentiality and privilege laws.68 
 
referrals, respect, and friends, possible retaliations, vulnerability to torts, and fear of malpractice 
actions in which the records of the peer review proceedings might be used.”  Id. at 115 (citing 
Gregory G. Gosfield, Medical Peer Review Protection in the Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP. L. Q. 
552, 558 (1979)). 
 67.  See Cruger, 599 So.2d at 113. Florida Statutes Section 766.101(5) reads:  
The investigations, proceedings, and records of a [medical review] committee . . . shall 
not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil action against a 
provider of professional health services arising out of the matters which are the subject 
of evaluation and review by such committee, and no person who was in attendance at a 
meeting of such committee shall be permitted or required to testify in any such civil 
action as to any evidence or other matters produced or presented during the proceedings 
of such committee or as to any findings, recommendations, evaluations, opinions, or 
other actions of such committee or any members thereof.   
FLA. STAT. §766.101(5) (West 2013).  For examples of other State statutes accomplishing similar 
purposes, see, e.g., ALA. CODE §22-21-8 (West 2012) (“Written reports, records, 
correspondence . . . shall be held in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction 
in evidence in any civil action against a health care professional or institution arising out of matters 
which are the subject of evaluation and review . . . .”); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §36-445.01 (West 
2013) (“All proceedings, records and materials prepared in connection with [peer] reviews . . . 
including all peer reviews of individual health care providers practicing in and applying to practice 
in hospitals or outpatient surgical centers and the records of such reviews, are confidential and are 
not subject to discovery.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. §19a-17b(d) (West 2013) (“The proceedings of a 
medical review committee conducting a peer review shall not be subject to discovery or 
introduction into evidence in any civil action for or against a health care provider arising out of the 
matters which are subject to evaluation and review by such committee . . . .”); D.C. CODE §44-
805(a)(1) (West 2012) (“The files, records, findings, opinions, recommendations, evaluations, and 
reports of a peer review body . . . shall be confidential and shall be neither discoverable nor 
admissible into evidence in any civil, criminal, legislative, or administrative proceeding.”); GA. 
CODE ANN. §31-7-133(a) (West 2013) (“The proceedings and records of a review organization shall 
be held in confidence and shall not be subject to discovery or introduction into evidence in any civil 
action . . . .”); N.C. GEN. STAT. §90-21.22(e)(f) (West 2013) (“No person participating in good faith 
in the peer review [program] . . . shall be required in a civil case to disclose any information 
acquired or opinions, recommendations, or evaluations acquired or developed solely in the course of 
participating in [peer review].”). 
 68.  See Monroe Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Roundtree, 721 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1998) (holding that a defendant doctor is not required to disclose matters which were the subject of 
evaluation and review by a medical peer review committee regarding the doctor’s staff privileges 
that were taken during an oral deposition because the information concerning the actions taken by 
the committee are protected by the peer review statute); Cruger, 599 So.2d at 111 (holding that 
mother’s request for copies of physician’s applications for hospital privileges after physician’s 
alleged negligent treatment of her son’s fractured thumb were protected because statutory privilege 
protects any document considered by medical review committee or hospital board as part of its 
decision-making process); Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217 (Fla. 1984) (holding that discovery 
privilege is not limited to medical malpractice actions and, in fact, includes defamation actions 
arising out of the matters which are the subject of evaluation and review by hospital credentials 
14
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The paradigm shift from expansive protection to Amendment 7 
resulted from a decades-long battle between doctors, insurance 
companies, and tort reformers on one side, and trial lawyers, patients’ 
rights advocates, and civil justice proponents on the other.69  Many 
defense lawyers believe that Amendment 7 was proposed by plaintiff 
lawyers as a direct response to Article I, Section 26 of the Florida 
Constitution, entitled “Claimant’s Right to Fair Compensation,” 
commonly known at Amendment 3 (“Amendment 3”).70  Amendment 3 
was another 2004 Florida initiative championed by the Florida Medical 
Association that sought tort reform by delineating attorney caps on non-
economic damages in medical malpractice negligence actions, 
essentially ensuring a greater percentage of the damage award to the 
claimant.71 
Due to a well-coordinated effort launched by Floridians for Patient 
Protection72 over 480,000 signatures were secured to put the 
Amendment 7 initiative on the ballot.73  Amendment 7 was approved by 
 
committees). 
 69.  J.B. Harris, Riding the Red Rocket: Amendment 7 and the End to Discovery Immunity of 
Adverse Medical Incidents in the State of Florida, 83-Mar FLA. B. J. 20 (2009) (citing Mary Ellen 
Klas, Doctors, Lawyers Wage Fierce Battle on State Ballot, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 28, 2004, 
available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-123718964.html. 
 70.  Amendment 3 states: 
In any medical liability claim involving a contingency fee, the claimant is entitled to 
receive no less than 70% of the first $250,000.00 in all damages received by the 
claimant, exclusive of reasonable and customary costs, whether received by judgment, 
settlement, or otherwise, and regardless of the number of defendants.  The claimant is 
entitled to 90% of all damages in excess of $250,000.00, exclusive of reasonable and 
customary costs and regardless of the number of defendants.  This provision is self-
executing and does not require implementing legislation. 
FLA. CONT. art I, § 26. 
 71.  Eric S. Matthew, A New Prescription: How a Thorough Diagnosis of the “Medical 
Malpractice” Amendments Reveals Potential Cures for Florida’s Ailing Citizen Initiative Process, 
14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 331, 350-351 (2006).  The Florida Medical Association was dissatisfied 
with the caps on noneconomic damages it achieved in 2003 and decided to ask voters to place a 
drastic cap on contingency fees for plaintiff lawyers in malpractice cases.  Fla. Physicians, Plaintiffs 
Lawyers Battle Over Med-Mal Discovery, INJURYBOARD.COM (Oct. 28, 2005, 10:56 AM), 
http://orlando.injuryboard.com/medical-malpractice/fla-physicians-plaintiffs-lawyers-battle-over-
med-mal-discovery.aspx?googleid=200192.  When the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers 
counterattacked with Amendment 7, hospitals, businesses, and insurance groups tried 
unsuccessfully to convince the Florida Medical Association doctors to drop their initiative in 
exchange for getting the plaintiffs lawyers to drop their initiative.  Id. 
 72.  Floridians for Patient Protection was affiliated with the Academy of Florida Trail 
Lawyers and the Florida Lawyers Action Group.  Sawran & Weill, supra note 45, at n. 3.  
 73.  Laura V. Yaeger, Amendment 7: Medical Tradition v. The Will of the People: Has 
Florida’s Peer Review Privilege Vanished, 13 MICH. ST. U. J. MED & L. 123, 127 (2009).  Interest 
in Amendment 7 was heightened due to Amendment 3, which passed in 2004 and severely restricted 
attorney contingency fees in malpractice suits.  See Mary Coombs, How Not to do Medical 
15
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the Florida electorate on November 2, 2004 with over eighty-one percent 
of affirmative votes.74  Amendment 7’s passage came to symbolize the 
public’s long-standing frustration over a perceived “protect our own” 
mentality that shielded from public scrutiny even the most dangerous 
doctors and hospitals.75 
Amendment 7 states that “patients have a right to access any 
records made or received in the course of business by a health care 
facility or provider relating to any adverse medical incident.”76  
Amendment 7 significantly eroded longstanding privileges and 
immunities surrounding Florida’s peer review, credentialing, 
investigations, quality assurance, and risk assessments as they applied to 
hospitals.77  For example, courts found that Florida Statutes, Sections 
395.0191(8) and 766.101(5), once utilized to protect medical peer 
review records, were preempted by Amendment 7.78  By granting access 
 
Malpractice Reform: A Florida Case Study, 18 HEALTH MATRIX 373, 386 (2008). 
 74.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text.  As an indication of Amendment 7’s popularity, 
5,849,125 citizens voted for it, while only 1,358,183 voted against it.  Id.  
 75.  Harris, supra note 69, at 20 (“In the public’s view, allowing the medical profession to 
continue to monitor itself, while hiding behind the veil of secrecy, had over time become like the 
proverbial fox guarding the hen house.”). 
 76.  FLA. CONST. art. X, §25.  The statute provides that the following terms have the 
following meaning:  
(1) The phrases “health care facility” and “health care provider” have the meaning given 
in general law related to a patient’s rights and responsibilities. 
(2) The term “patient” means an individual who has sought, is seeking, is undergoing, or 
has undergone care or treatment in a health care facility or by a health care provider. 
(3) The phrase “adverse medical incident” means medical negligence, intentional 
misconduct, and any other act, neglect, or default of a health care facility or health care 
provider that caused or could have caused injury to or death of a patient, including, but 
not limited to, those incidents that are required by state or federal law to be reported to 
any governmental agency or body, and incidents that are reported to or reviewed by any 
health care facility peer review, risk management, quality assurance, credentials, or 
similar committee, or any representative of any such committees. 
(4) The phrase “have access to any records” means, in addition to any other procedure 
for producing such records provided by general law, making the records available for 
inspection and copying upon formal or informal request by the patient or a representative 
of the patient, provided that current records which have been made publicly available by 
publication or on the Internet may be “provided” by reference to the location at which 
the records are publicly available.   
Id. (cited in Florida Eye Clinic, P.A. v. Gmach, 14 So. 3d 1044, 1045 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009). 
 77.  Harris, supra note 69, at 20.  The rationale for such protections had been that by ensuring 
full, frank, and open peer review and self-evaluation, the quality of patient care improves.  Holly v. 
Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 220 (Fla. 1984); see also Cruger v. Love, 599 So.2d 111, 114 (Fla. 1992). 
 78.  See West Florida Reg’l Med. Ctr. Inc. v. See, No. SC09–1997, 2012 WL 87282 (Fla. Jan. 
12, 2012) (finding that even if the document in question is considered to be within the protections of 
sections 766.101(5) and 395.0191(8), Amendment 7 mandates its disclosure because the document 
is a record of an adverse medical incident).  Here, a blank application form upon which information 
was placed to generate a medical staff application was an adverse medical incident record because it 
16
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to such documents, not only were hospitals exposed to new potential 
liabilities and increased financial burdens, but peer review in Florida 
was changed forever by new disincentives for both hospitals and its peer 
review committee members.79 
Evidently concerned by the initiative’s outcome, which essentially 
allowed Amendment 7 implementation to bypass all three branches of 
government, Florida’s legislature passed an enabling statute (“Enabling 
Statute”)80 during the 2005 regular sessions which restricted 
Amendment 7.81  Many argue that the legislature’s response was a clear 
statement they believed the pendulum had swung too far and that the 
benefit to current and future patients of having easy access to adverse 
medical incident information is attenuated, while the harmful effect on 
physicians’ willingness to participate in peer review is far more direct.82  
“Metaphorically speaking, the electorate inadvertently supported 
Amendment 7 which treats the disease (tort reform hindering plaintiff 
attorneys) instead of the patient (health care as a whole).”83 
 
was pertinent to the process and procedure that led to the alleged negligent grant of medical staff 
privileges.  Id. 
 79.  Yaeger, supra note 73, at 148 (predicting the potential costs involved in responding to 
Amendment 7 document requests will be enormous with hospitals unequipped with the staff to 
respond timely). 
 80.  See FLA. STAT. ANN. §381.028 (West 2013).  Significantly, § 381.028(6)(a) and (b) 
provided that Amendment 7 neither repealed restrictions on the admissibility of records to adverse 
medical incidents, nor made them discoverable or admissible into evidence for any purpose, 
including impeachment, in any civil or administrative action against a health care facility or health 
care provider.  Id.  The intent of these provisions was to keep intact the long standing privileges and 
immunities surrounding peer review, credentialing, investigations of adverse medical incidents, 
quality assurance, and risk assessment set forth under § §395.0191, 395.0193, 395.0197, 766.101, 
and 766.1016, the very statutes Amendment 7 aimed to modernize.  See Florida Hosp. Waterman, 
Inc. v. Buster, 984 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 2008)). 
 81.  Matthew, supra note 71, at 332.   
 82.  Coombs, supra note 73, at 424.  “Perhaps the most lacking element of the Florida 
initiative process is that no law requires disseminating information about potential long-term 
ancillary effects of passing individual or multiple initiative . . . .  Unfortunately, most citizens were 
unaware of the potential downsides of enacting these initiatives . . .”  Matthew, supra note 71, at 
346.  See Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217, 220 (1984) (noting the court’s assumption that the 
legislature balanced the potential benefit to providing broad disclosure of evidence against the 
potential for health care cost containment offered by effective self-regulation, finding the latter to be 
of greater weight; this careful balancing is exactly the kind of policy judgment which is exclusively 
the responsibility of the legislature rather than the courts).  The Holly court’s statement furthers the 
argument against Florida’s citizen initiative process which allows laws to bypass all branches of 
government and the requisite policy judgment checks and balances.  See Matthew, supra note 71, at 
332.   
 83.  Matthew, supra note 71, at 350-351.  While on its surface Amendment 7 helps patients 
acquire important information, the fact that Amendment 7 advocates so easily downplayed the 
obvious importance of privilege in the medical setting demonstrates the shortcomings of Florida’s 
initiative process.  Id. at 351.  As one author states:  
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A frenzy of litigation followed the Enabling Statute that resulted in 
conflicting and opposing outcomes.84  In March 2008, in Florida 
Hospital Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, (“Buster II”),85 which was appealed 
from a Florida District Court, (“Buster III”),86 the Florida Supreme 
Court weighed in and invalidated several provisions of the Enabling 
Statute, finding that they were in conflict with Amendment 7.87  
Specifically, the Florida Supreme Court held that Amendment 7 was 
self-executing, applied retroactively to existing records and its 
retroactive application does not violate a hospital’s due process rights.88 
 
The ancillary effects of the medical malpractice amendments reveal that Florida’s citizen 
initiative process is in a quandary: special interest groups propose self-serving 
amendments; initiatives are presented to Florida voters without sufficient deliberation; 
the summarizing text of an initiative can understate its wide-ranging socioeconomic 
effects; there is no substantive review of the initiatives.   
Id. at 351. 
 84.  Yaeger, supra note 73, at 132.  The divergent outcomes included several Florida court 
cases including the following decisions: Florida Hosp. Waterman, Inc. v. Buster, 932 So. 2d 344 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (“Buster I”) (holding that Amendment 7 is self-executing); Notami Hosp. 
of Fla., Inc. v. Bowen, 927 So. 2d 139 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that Amendment 7 is self-
executing, applies retroactively, and that the statute purporting to implement Amendment 7 is 
unconstitutional); Bayfront Med. Ctr. v. Neavins, 920 So.2d 185, 186-87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2006) (dismissing petition for writ of certiorari as mooted by passage of the Patients’ Right-to-
Know About Adverse Medical Incidents Act); Rusiecki v. Jackson-Curtis, No. 03-008570-CI-21, 
2005 WL 408133, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2005) (holding that holding that Amendment 7 was 
not self-executing and cannot be applied retroactively to impair vested privacy and privilege rights); 
Richardson v. Nath, No. 04-006970-01-21, 2005 WL 408132, at *1 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Jan. 18, 2005) 
(holding that Amendment 7 was not self-executing and cannot be retroactively applied to impair the 
hospital’s vested rights). 
 85.  984 So.2d 478 (Fla. 2008). 
 86.  932 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 5d D.C.A. 2006)  
 87.  Id.   
 88.  Id. at 481.  In concluding that Amendment 7 is self-executing, the Buster II Court applied 
the standard set forth in Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1960), stating that a constitutional 
provision should be self-executing if it “lays down a sufficient rule by means of which the right or 
purpose which it gives or is intended to accomplish may be determined, enjoyed, or protected 
without the aid of legislative enactment.”  Buster II, 984 So. 2d at 485.  Applying Gray’s standard, 
the Buster II Court held that Amendment 7 provides a sufficient rule by which patients can gain 
access to records of a health care provider’s adverse medical incidents.  Id. at 486.  The court 
supports its conclusion by stating that Amendment 7 expressly declares that it will be effective on 
passage, indicating that its effectiveness in overriding prior statutory law was not to be dependent 
upon the enactment of implementing legislation.  Id. 
In deciding that Amendment 7 applied retroactively, the Buster II Court relied on its two-prong 
analysis articulated in Metro. Dade Cnty v. Chase Fed. Hous. Corp., 737 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1999).  
Buster II, 984 So. 2d at 487.  The first prong analyzes whether there is clear legislative intent to 
apply the statute retroactively, and the second prong focuses on whether retroactive application is 
constitutionally permissible.  Buster II, 948 So. 2d at 486-487 (citing Chase Fed., 737 So. 2d at 
499).  Buster II focused on the plain language of the Amendment to satisfy the first prong, and 
concluded that the guarantee of confidentiality previously afforded adverse medical incident reports 
and peer review committees did not create a vested right, and thus, the retroactive application is not 
18
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Based on this holding several provisions of the Enabling Statute 
that limited access to information granted by Amendment 7 were 
invalidated.89  Specifically, the Buster II court identified five conflict 
provisions between Amendment 7 and the Enabling Statute, and 
concluded the following language should be severed from the statute: (1) 
language stating that only final reports were discoverable; (2) language 
providing for disclosure of only final reports relating to the same or 
substantially similar condition, treatment or diagnosis with that of the 
patient requesting access; (3) limitations to produce only those records 
generated after November 2, 2004; (4) language stating that that 
Amendment 7 will have no effect on existing privilege statutes; and (5) 
language providing that patients can only access the records of a facility 
or provider in which they are a patient.90  Consequently, Buster II’s 
ruling preserved the broad interpretation of Amendment 7, eroding 
completely any peer review protections in Florida.91  Hospital insiders 
believe that since Amendment 7 passed, meaningful peer review has 
come to a screeching halt, stating further that it was already difficult to 
get physicians to engage in peer review prior to Amendment 7 and that it 
will now be impossible.92  Physician resistance to peer review 
participation appeared warranted as hospitals began to see an influx of 
Amendment 7 motions to compel peer review documents after the 
 
unconstitutional.  Buster II, 984 So. 2d at 490.  The Court then used language from Div. of 
Workers’ Comp. v. Brevda, 420 So. 2d 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) which read: “to be vested, a 
right must be more than a mere expectation based on an anticipation of the continuance of an 
existing law; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enforcement of a 
demand . . . .” Brevda, 420 So.2d at 891 (cited in Buster II, 984 So. 2d at 491).  Based on this 
language, the Buster II Court found that the hospital’s claim rests on a mere expectation of the 
continuance of the legislative policy of limited access to the proceedings of peer review committees. 
Buster II, 984 So. 2d at 490.  In concluding that Amendment 7 applied to existing records, the 
Buster II Court agreed with the succinct analysis from Notami Hosp. which stated: 
Here, the plain language of the amendment permits patients to access any record relating 
to any adverse medical incident, and defines ‘patient’ to include individuals who had 
previously undergone treatment.  The use of the word “any” to define the scope of 
discoverable records relating to adverse medical incidents, and the broad definition of 
‘patient’ to include those who ‘previously’ received treatment expresses a clear intent 
that the records subject to disclosure include those created prior to the effective date of 
the amendment.  The effective date merely sets forth the date patients obtained the right 
to receive the records requested.  Because the plain language of the amendment 
expresses a clear intent that it be applied to include records created prior to its effective 
date, doing so is not an unconstitutional retroactive application. 
Buster II, 984 So. 2d at 487 (quoting Notami Hosp., 927 So. 2d at 145). 
 89.  Buster II, 984 So. 2d at 492. 
 90.  Id. at 492-493. 
 91.  See Yaeger, supra note 73, at 147. 
 92.  Id. at 148 (citing an interview with a member of a Florida hospital’s executive staff). 
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Buster II decision.93 
III. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
A.  Hospitals Search for Amendment 7 Protection 
As Florida hospitals scrambled to protect peer review documents, a 
primary argument was that the HCQIA serves as a definitive expression 
of policy favoring a statutory peer review privilege.94  Courts arriving at 
the opposite conclusion concede that the HCQIA placed importance on 
maintaining immunity for participants of the peer review process, but 
believe that Congress “spoke loudly with its silence in not including a 
privilege against discovery of peer review material in the HCQIA.”95 
Several federal courts recognized the lack of an explicit medical 
peer review privilege in the HCQIA and deemed this a policy choice by 
Congress.96  As one federal court in Ohio stated: 
Far from creating a broad privilege, Congress, in enacting the HCQIA, 
carefully crafted a very specific privilege, applicable to peer review 
material submitted to the Secretary [of Health and Human Services] 
pursuant to the dictates of the mandatory reporting provisions of that 
statute.  That is as far as Congress went, and that is as far as this Court 
should apply the privilege contained therein.97 
Two Florida court of appeals cases have similarly held that no 
federal statutory peer review privilege was created by the HCQIA.  West 
 
 93.  e.g., Florida Hosp. Assoc. v. Viamonte, No. 4:08cv312-RH/WCS, 2008 WL 5101755, at 
*2 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 26, 2008) (finding that the Florida Hospital Association had received 400 
demands for information under Amendment 7).  Prior to Amendment 7, the Florida Hospital 
Association would have refused many of the requests for information and would have been within 
their right under Florida statutes to do so.  Id.  However, post-Amendment 7, they now must either 
provide the information against their wishes or risk fine or enforcement action.  Id. 
 94.  Bassler, supra note 15, at 703-704.  Specifically, advocates point to the way in which 
HCQIA alleviates physicians’ fear of participating in peer review by reducing potential liability, 
establishing detailed reporting requirements for reporting settlements, judgments and arbitration 
awards, and setting forth requirements for peer review immunity.  Id.   
 95.  Id. at 704 (quoting United States v. QHG of Ind., Inc., No. 1:97–CV–174, 1998 WL 
1756728, at *7 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 8, 1998).  
 96.  See, e.g., In re Admin. Subpoena Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 400 F.Supp.2d 
386, 391-92 (D. Mass. 2005); Nilavar v. Mercy Health Sys.-W. Ohio, 210 F.R.D. 597 (S.D. Ohio 
2002); Teasdale v. Marin Gen. Hosp., 138 F.R.D. 691, 694 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Mattice v. Mem’l 
Hosp. of S. Bend, 203 F.R.D. 381, 386-87 (N.D. Ind. 2001) (concluding that the HCQIA does not 
privilege peer review materials and that these materials are therefore discoverable). 
 97.  Nilavar, 210 F.R.D. at 602 (holding that physician peer review privilege was nonexistent 
within federal common law, and extensive authority, as well as “reason and experience,” prevented 
against adopting it in action). 
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Florida Regional Medical Center, Inc. v. See98 involved a petitioner’s 
argument that Amendment 7 violates the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution because it is impliedly preempted by the 
federal HCQIA.99  In arriving at its conclusion, the court stated that in 
enacting the HCQIA, Congress did not provide for confidentiality or 
privilege of peer review records or communications, but did provide 
peer review participants with immunity from liability for damages with 
respect to their participation in such actions.100  The court continued by 
stating that the HCQIA further provides the following instruction: 
Except as specifically provided in this subchapter, nothing in this 
subchapter shall be construed as changing the liabilities or immunities 
under law or as preempting or overriding any State law which provides 
incentives, immunities, or protection for those engaged in a 
professional review action that is in addition to or greater than that 
provided by this subchapter.101 
The court concluded its analysis that the HCQIA did not preempt 
Amendment 7 by stating, “Congress expressly dealt with the issue of 
immunity from liability for communications related to peer review and 
with the issue of preemption of laws concerning such protections.”102  In 
Columbia Hosp. Corp. of South Broward v. Fain,103 the Florida court of 
appeals used a parallel argument to See to reject the hospital 
organization’s argument that Amendment 7 is impliedly preempted by 
the HCQIA by concluding that “the abolition of peer review discovery 
protections is contrary to the Act’s intent to foster ‘effective peer 
review.’”104 
 
 98.  18 So. 3d 676 (Fla. 1d D.C.A. 2009). 
 99.  Id. at 684. 
 100.  Id. at 685. 
 101.  Id.  
 102.  West Florida Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. See, 18 So. 3d at 685.  The court continued by 
quoting the HCQIA, saying that Congress further expressed the following intent: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as affecting in any manner the rights and 
remedies afforded patients under any provision of Federal or State law to seek redress 
for any harm or injury suffered as a result of negligent treatment or care by any 
physician, health care practitioner, or health care entity, or as limiting any defenses or 
immunities available to any physician, health care practitioner, or health care entity. 
Id. at 685-686 (citing 42. U.S.C.A. §11115 (West 2013)).  The See court found that Congress again 
fell short of addressing the confidentiality or privileged status of records generated in peer review 
processes, but did express its intent not to undermine the ability of patients to seek redress for 
medical malpractice. See, 18 So. 3d at 686. 
 103.  16 So. 3d 236, 242 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).   
 104.  Id. at 242.  Here, the Florida court of appeals uses language from subchapters I and II of 
the HCQIA to conclude that under the HCQIA, Florida’s statutes, which had provided greater 
protection and incentives by providing discovery protections for peer review proceedings, were 
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Impacted significantly because of the absence of explicit protection 
for peer review, and despite its legislative history focusing on 
encouraging meaningful peer review through appropriate protection, the 
HCQIA alone was not enough to defeat Amendment 7.105  Left to 
alternate arguments, hospitals unsuccessfully argued for protection under 
work-product privilege,106 impairment of contracts,107 and that certain 
Amendment 7 requests were irrelevant, overbroad and/or unduly 
 
expressly not preempted.  Id.  HCQIA Subchapter I contains provisions regarding how it is to be 
construed with state law and provides: “nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as changing 
the liabilities or immunities under law or as preempting . . . any State law which provides 
incentives, immunities, or protection for those engaged in a professional review action that is in 
addition to or greater than that provided by this subchapter.”  42 U.S.C.A. § 11115(a) (West 2013).  
Subchapter II of the HCQIA provides for limited confidentiality of certain reports which must be 
submitted for inclusion in a national database. 42 U.S.C.A. § 11137(b)(1) (West 2013).  Fain 
contended that the provisions of Subchapter I and II of the HCQIA work in tandem and that peer 
review cannot be “effective” if the discovery protections previously afforded by Florida’s statutes 
are abrogated by Amendment 7.  Fain, 16 So. 3d at 242-243.  However, in Buster II, the Florida 
Supreme Court made clear that the limited discovery protections previously afforded by Florida’s 
statutes were effectively abolished by the passage of Amendment 7.  Id. at 243 (citing Buster II, 984 
So. 2d at 488-89).  ”These discovery protections were not mandated by the HCQIA, and while they 
may have contributed to effective peer review in Florida, the people of the State of Florida are not 
preempted from abolishing these statutory protections by constitutional amendment.”  Fain, 16 So. 
3d at 243.  The Fain court concluded that Columbia’s disagreement with Amendment 7 is not 
sufficient to overcome the presumption of its constitutionality or to demonstrate a departure from 
the essential requirements of law.  Id. 
 105.  See supra notes 94-104 and accompanying text. 
 106.  See Lakeland Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Neely ex rel. Neely, 8 So. 3d 1268 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2009) (finding that while records prepared in anticipation of litigation are prepared by clients, at 
least in part, to assist lawyers, this line of reasoning was insufficient to override the broad right of 
access to adverse medical incident reports guaranteed under Amendment 7 which was intended to 
provide a clear path to access medical incident records); Florida Eye Clinic v. Gmach, 14 So. 3d 
1044 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that Amendment 7 supersedes any fact work-product 
privilege because Amendment 7 expresses a clear intent that patient have a right to access any 
record made or received in the course of business that relates to an adverse medical incident).  
Notably, the Gmach court went on to note a distinction between “fact” work-product and “opinion” 
work-product, noting that it did not read Amendment 7 as ”evincing an intent from the voters to 
eliminate the privilege of opinion work product.”  Id. at 1050.  Thus, the Gmach court held that 
there was a distinction between opinion work-product and fact work-product, bringing to light the 
necessity of understanding precisely which documents a medical provider is attempting to shield 
using the work-product privilege.  Id. 
 107.  See Fain, 16 So. 3d at 236 (holding that Amendment 7 does not violate the Contracts 
Clause on the basis that the amendment impaired contracts between the hospital and its doctors 
providing for confidentiality of peer review proceedings because the impairment was not severe and 
the public’s interest in providing for broad discoverability of adverse medical incident reports met 
the constitutional hurdle); West Florida Reg’l Med. Ctr v. See, 18 So. 3d 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2009) (holding that Amendment 7 does not operate as a substantial impairment of the contractual 
relationship between a hospital and its staff by preventing the hospital from honoring confidentiality 
provisions in its medical staff bylaws, and therefore, Amendment 7 does not violate the Federal 
Contracts Clause; additionally, the plain language of the bylaws expressly limited guarantee of 
confidentiality to the extent permitted by law).   
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burdensome.108  Seemingly left without a defense to Amendment 7 
motions, Florida hospitals received its strongest defense yet in the form 
of new federal legislation.109 
B. Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act (“PSQIA”) 
Faced with plaintiffs’ attorneys circumventing state laws with 
strong peer review protections and other states, like Florida, eroding 
away peer review protections, Congress was forced to reconsider the 
federal statutory protections afforded peer review to ensure a meaningful 
process.110  Congress responded with the PSQIA, stating in its legislative 
history that: “[c]urrently, the State peer review protections are 
inadequate to allow the sharing of information to promote patient 
safety.”111  This conclusion was supported with a 1999 Institute of 
Medicine (IOM) report, entitled To Err is Human,112 which estimated 
that as many as 98,000 Americans die each year from preventable 
medical errors.113  Differentiating from the HCQIA’s catalyst which 
 
 108.  See Fain, 16 So. 3d at 240 (holding that a request for Amendment 7 materials is not an 
ordinary discovery request that may be subjected to overbreadth, irrelevance, or burdensomeness 
objections because pursuant to Amendment 7, a patient has the absolute right to discover records 
relating to any adverse medical incident and that right is not conditioned on the discovery being 
relevant to a pending claim); Amisub North Ridge Hosp., Inc. v. Sonaglia, 995 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that Amendment 7 does not limit the definition of a patient to one 
seeking the information for any type of proper purpose; thus Amendment 7 does not require the 
information that a patient seeks to be relevant to a pending medical malpractice action or to a 
medical care decision); Morton Plant Hosp. Ass’n, Inc. v. Shahbas ex rel. Shahbas, 960 So. 2d 820 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that whether a request is overly burdensome is not a relevant 
consideration for an Amendment 7 request).   
 109.  See infra notes 111, 118-123 and accompanying text. 
 110.  Brief of the Idaho Hosp. Ass’ns as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 
28, at *9 (discussing the PSQIA’s broad approval of the medical peer review process and more 
sweeping evidentiary protections that are now afforded peer review individuals and documents). 
 111.  S. REP. NO. 109-544, at 3 (2005).   
 112.  COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST, OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: 
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et. al. eds., 2000). 
 113.  Id.  “The report emphasizes the need to make system improvements and advises that 
health care information reporting systems must develop and implement processes through which 
medical error information can be identified, analyzed and utilized to prevent further medical 
errors.”  S. REP. NO. 108-196, at 2 (2003) (discussing To Err Is Human, supra note 112)).  
Unfortunately, society’s long-standing reliance on the threat of malpractice litigation discourages 
health care professionals and organizations from disclosing, sharing, and discussing information 
about medical errors.  S. REP. NO. 108-196, at 2 (2003).  Unlike civil actions, the IOM’s systems-
based approach focuses on prospective systematic safety remedies, rather than on retrospectively 
applying blame, thus working to prevent future error.  Levy, Mareniss, Iacovelli & Howard, supra 
note 16, at 399.  
In To Err is Human and subsequent reports, the IOM recommends a tiered approach to 
improve the quality of care: federal protections for a voluntary error reporting system 
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focused on the need “to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians to 
move from State to State without disclosure or discovery of the 
physician’s previous damaging or incompetent performance,”114 the 
PSQIA addressed the broader problem of systematic failures in the 
delivery of health care that resulted in preventable adverse events. 
Specifically, the PSQIA stated, “One of the main conclusions was that 
the majority of medical errors do not result from individual recklessness 
or the actions of a particular group; rather, most errors are caused by 
faulty systems, processes, and conditions that lead people to make 
mistakes or fail to prevent adverse events.”115 
In a 2003 report on the PSQIA, the Senate declared its intent to 
remedy this situation by “promoting a learning environment . . . to move 
beyond the existing culture of blame and punishment . . . to a ‘culture of 
safety’ that focuses on . . . the prevention of future medical errors” in an 
effort to increase patient safety.116  With its mission clear, on July 29, 
2005, the PSQIA was signed into law.117 
 
(which is the focus of this bill); a narrowly focused mandatory reporting system to 
collect standardized information by State governments about adverse events that result in 
death or serious harm . . . increased investment in information technology; establishing a 
national focus to create leadership and enhance the knowledge base about safety; raising 
standards and expectations for improvements in safety; and creating safety systems 
inside health care organizations through the implementation of safe practices at the 
delivery level.  Enactment of [the PSQIA] is a significant step in an ongoing effort to 
improve the quality of care provided to all Americans.  
S. REP. NO. 108-196, at 2 (2003). 
 114.  KD ex. rel. Dieffenbach v. United States, 715 F.Supp. 2d 587, 595 (2010) (citing 42 
U.S.C.A. § 11101(2) (West 2013)). 
 115.  Dieffenbach, 715 F.Supp. 2d at 595 (quoting Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 
Fed. Reg. 8112, 8112-13 (Feb. 12, 2008)).  Dieffenbach also quoted the same PSQIA Federal 
Register content by citing that:  
Much of the impetus for this legislation can be traced to the publication of the landmark 
report, ‘To Err is Human,’ by the Institute of Medicine in 1999 [which] cited studies that 
found that at least 44,000 people and potentially as many as 98,000 people die in U.S. 
hospitals each year as a result of preventable medical errors.  Based on these studies and 
others, the Report estimated that the total national costs of preventable adverse 
events . . . to be between $17 billion and $29 billion, of which health care costs represent 
one-half. 
Dieffenbach, 715 F.Supp. 2d at 595 (quoting Patient Safety and Quality Improvement, 73 Fed. Reg. 
8112, 8112-13 (Feb. 12, 2008)).   
 116.  Dieffenbach, 715 F. Supp.2d at 595 (quoting S. REP. NO. 108-196, at 2 (2003). 
 117.  Patient and Safety Quality Improvement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-41, 119 Stat. 424 
(2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-21 to -26 (2013)).  In remarks made at the time the PSQIA 
was signed into law, President George W. Bush stated that the PSQIA is a “commonsense law” 
designed to allow others to learn from the collective experiences of physicians and nurses by 
protecting providers who report critical patient safety information.  Levy, Mareniss, Iacovelli & 
Howard, supra note 16, at 407 (citing Remarks on Signing the Patient Safety and Quality 
Improvement Act of 2005, 41 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1227 (July 29, 2005)).   
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In short, the PSQIA guarantees confidentiality and provides a 
privilege to patient safety work product (“PSWP”) that is voluntarily 
submitted to a patient safety organization (“PSO”).118  The PSQIA was 
drafted “to ensure that this legislation strikes the appropriate balance 
between plaintiff rights and creating a new culture in the health care 
industry that provides incentives to identify and learn from errors.”119  
The PSQIA extends state peer review protections to patient safety and 
quality improvement materials that are collected and analyzed by 
hospitals for internal use or shared for the purposes of improving patient 
safety and quality of care.120 
Testimony received by Congress made it clear that a “safe harbor” 
must be created for the reporting of medical error information, or no 
provider would gather and report such data because the risk of liability 
was too great.121  Thus, while the PSQIA fails to mention peer review 
explicitly, its extensive discussion of broad federal protection in its 
legislative history makes it clear that Congress intended that the PSQIA 
protect the peer review process.122 
 
 118.  42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-22 (West 2013). 
 119.  S. REP. NO. 108-196, at 3 (2003).  This Senate Report stated that the PSQIA recognizes 
that patient safety can best be improved by fostering efforts to identify and fix errors while ensuring 
that providers remain accountable.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 2.  The PSQIA privilege encompasses not only the report to the PSO but also: 
[A]ll aspects of the analysis of, and subsequent corrective actions related to, adverse 
events, medical errors, and ‘near misses’ reported as patient safety data.  It covers all 
deliberations, including oral and written communications, and work products that meet 
the requirements for patient safety data.  This legislation also establishes confidentiality 
protections for this written and oral patient safety data to promote the reporting of 
medical errors.  As a result, health care providers will be able to report and analyze 
medical errors, without fear that these reports will become public or be used in litigation.  
This nonpunitive environment will foster the sharing of medical error information that is 
a significant step in a process to improve the safety, quality, and outcomes of medical 
care.   
Id. at 4.  See also Dieffenbach, 715 F.Supp. 2d at 595-96. 
 121.  S. REP. NO. 108-196, at 1 (2003).  While the PSQIA’s confidentiality and privilege 
protections are broad, limited disclosures are allowed under certain conditions.  Levy, Mareniss, 
Iacovelli & Howard, supra note 16, at 412.  The most significant exception involves the disclosure 
of patient PSWP during criminal proceedings.  Id.  PSWP may be disclosed if the court determines 
that the information contains material evidence that cannot be reasonably obtained from another 
source.  Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-22(c)(1)(A) (West 2013)).  Disclosures are also permitted to 
law enforcement officials if a provider reasonably believes PSWP is necessary to facilitate criminal 
law enforcement activity and between authorized entities.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-22(c)(2)(G); 42 
U.S.C.A. § 299b-22(c)(2).   
 122.  See Kathryn Leaman, Let’s Give Them Something to Talk About: How the PSQIA may 
Provide Federal Privilege and Confidentiality Protections to the medical Peer Review Process, 11 
MICH. ST. U. J. MED & L. 177, 193 (2007).  “[A] possible benefit from omitting the term ‘peer 
review’ from the [PSQIA] is that it allowed Congress to expand the class of activities generating 
protected patient safety information beyond the limited scope of peer review.”  Levy, Mareniss, 
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In lieu of the PSQIA, Amendment 7 is ripe for a new round of 
litigation, with the statutory privilege created by the PSQIA serving as a 
potential precursor to a supplementary common law peer review 
privilege.123 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Framework of the PSQIA 
Understanding the practical impact of PSQIA implementation 
begins with understanding the mechanics behind the law.  The PSQIA 
provides federal privilege and confidentiality protection to PSWP124 that 
 
Iacovelli & Howard, supra note 16, at 414.   
 123.  See, e.g., Complaint, Lee Mem’l Health Sys. v. Guillermo et al., No. 2:10-cv-00700, 
2011 WL 5826672 (Nov. 18, 2011) (2:10-cv-00700-CEH-DNF), 2010 WL 5809357 (arguing that 
Amendment 7 is preempted by the PSQIA). 
 124.  The PSQIA defines “patient safety work product” as:  
Except as provided in subparagraph (B), the term “patient safety work product” means 
any data, reports, records, memoranda, analyses (such as root cause analyses), or written 
or oral statements— 
(i) which— 
(I) are assembled or developed by a provider for reporting to a patient safety 
organization and are reported to a patient safety organization; or 
(II) are developed by a patient safety organization for the conduct of patient safety 
activities; 
and which could result in improved patient safety, health care quality, or health care 
outcomes; or 
(ii) which identify or constitute the deliberations or analysis of, or identify the fact of 
reporting pursuant to, a patient safety evaluation system. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-21(7)(a) (West 2013). 
The PSQIA expressly clarifies that definition, such that: 
(i) Information described in subparagraph (A) does not include a patient’s medical 
record, billing and discharge information, or any other original patient or provider 
record. 
(ii) Information described in subparagraph (A) does not include information that is 
collected, maintained, or developed separately, or exists separately, from a patient safety 
evaluation system. Such separate information or a copy thereof reported to a patient 
safety organization shall not by reason of its reporting be considered patient safety work 
product. 
(iii) Nothing in this part shall be construed to limit— 
(I) the discovery of or admissibility of information described in this subparagraph 
in a criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding; 
(II) the reporting of information described in this subparagraph to a Federal, State, 
or local governmental agency for public health surveillance, investigation, or other 
public health purposes or health oversight purposes; or 
(III) a provider’s recordkeeping obligation with respect to information described in 
this subparagraph under Federal, State, or local law. 
42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-21(7)(b). 
Congress indicated that not all traditional healthcare operations, record keeping 
26
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is assembled for reporting to a PSO125 within a patient safety evaluation 
system (“PSES”).126  Because the reporting of medical errors is 
voluntary under the PSQIA, the legal protections that are provided to 
hospitals act as an incentive to encourage reporting.127  PSOs are 
organizations that collect and analyze PSWP.128  Once the PSO collects 
 
documents, or communications fall under the patient safety work product definition . . . .  
The key distinction between the traditional healthcare operations that Congress intended 
to exclude and the peer review process is that peer review materials submitted to the 
PSO as patient safety work product originated from the peer review process itself, rather 
than from the actual delivery of healthcare . . . . Therefore, anything created during the 
peer review process by relying on non-patient safety work product, such as medical 
records, physician notes, operations logs, billing records, records of drug deliveries, et. 
falls under the patient safety work product definition and the protections granted by the 
PSQIA because it does not originate during initial healthcare delivery. 
Leaman, supra note 122, at 191-192. 
 125.  A PSO is defined in the PSQIA as: “a private or public entity or component thereof that 
is listed by the Secretary of Health and Human Services pursuant to section 299b-24(d) of this title.” 
42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-21(4).  The PSQIA requires the Secretary to compile and maintain a listing of 
entities with respect to which there is an acceptance of a certification as a PSO.  42 U.S.C.A. § 
299b-24(d) (West 2013).  The process for certification and listings of PSOs is implemented and 
overseen by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (“AHRQ”), while compliance with the 
confidentiality provisions is handled by the Office of Civil Rights.  Patient Safety and Quality 
Improvement Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 70732 (Nov. 21, 2008).  This PSO listing can be found 
online at: Listed Patient Safety Organizations, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND 
QUALITY, http://www.pso.ahrq.gov/listing/psolist.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2012).   
 126.  The term “patient safety evaluation system” means the collection, management, or 
analysis of information for reporting to or by a patient safety organization.  42 U.S.C.A. §299b-
21(6).  Documentation of PSES clearly establishes when information is PSWP, thus although 
healthcare organization are not required to document its PSES, the Department of Health and 
Human Services highly encourages it.  Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Final Rule, 73 Fed. 
Reg. 70732, 70738-70739 (Nov. 21, 2008).  PSES is defined by reference to “patient safety 
activities,” which include:  
(1) efforts to improve patient safety and the quality of health care delivery; (2) the 
collection and analysis of patient safety work product; (3) the development and 
dissemination of information regarding patient safety, such as recommendations, 
protocols or information regarding best practices; (4) the utilization of patient safety 
work product for the purposes of encouraging a culture of safety, as well as providing 
feedback and assistance to effectively minimize patient risk; (5) the maintenance of 
procedures to preserve confidentiality with respect to patient safety work product; (6) the 
provision of appropriate security measures with respect to patient safety work product; 
(7) the utilization of qualified staff; and (8) activities related to the operation of a patient 
safety evaluation system and to the provision of feedback to participants in a patient 
safety evaluation system. 
David S. Ivill & Amy Hooper Kearbey, The Rise of Patient Safety Organizations: Reports and 
Sharing without Fear of Liability, N.Y. L.J. (Nov. 2, 2009) (citing 42 U.S.C. §299b-21(5); Patient 
Safety and Quality Improvement Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 70732, 70798 (Nov. 21, 2008) (to be 
codified at 42 C.F.R. §3.20)). 
 127.  Bell, supra note 18, at 747. 
 128.  KD ex. rel. Dieffenbach v. United States, 715 F.Supp.2d 587, 596 (D. Del. 2010) (citing 
S. REP. NO. 108-196, at 5 (2003). 
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PSWP, it evaluates the documented medical errors and recommends 
ways that the hospital can prevent similar medical errors from happening 
again, thus improving patient safety and quality of care.129  The 
hospital’s PSES must promptly submit PSWP to the hospital’s PSO 
because PSQIA privilege will not apply if the PSO fails to receive the 
PSWP.130 
With limited exceptions,131 to encourage PSWP reporting and 
create a non-punitive environment for evaluating medical errors, the 
PSQIA provides that PSWP shall be privileged and confidential: 
(a) Privilege: Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or 
local law, and subject to subsection (c) . . . patient safety work product 
shall be privileged and shall not be - (1) subject to a Federal, State, or 
local civil, criminal, or administrative subpoena or order, including in a 
Federal, State, or local civil or administrative disciplinary proceeding 
against a provider; (2) subject to discovery in connection with a 
Federal, State, or local civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding, 
including in a Federal, State, or local civil or administrative 
disciplinary proceeding against a provider; (3) subject to disclosure 
pursuant to section 552 of title 5, (commonly known as the Freedom of 
Information Act) or any other similar Federal, State, or local law; (4) 
admitted as evidence in any Federal, State, or local governmental civil 
proceeding, criminal proceeding, administrative rulemaking 
proceeding, or administrative adjudicatory proceeding, including any 
such proceeding against a provider; or (5) admitted in a professional 
disciplinary  proceeding of a professional disciplinary body established 
or specifically authorized under State law. 
(b) Confidentiality of patient safety work product: Notwithstanding 
any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, and subject to 
subsection (c) of this section, patient safety work product shall be 
confidential and shall not be disclosed.132 
 
 129.  Leaman, supra note 122, at 185-186.  PSOs, in turn, voluntarily report non-identifiable 
PSWP to AHRQ which maintains a network of databases to analyze PSWP reporting.  Id. at 186.   
 130.  See S. REP. NO. 108-196, at 7 (2003) (emphasizing that while the PSQIA remains silent 
on the required reporting timeframe, hospitals must report patient safety work product to the PSO 
within two months from the time the event being evaluated occurred to be eligible for PSQIA 
protections). 
 131.   42 U.S.C.A. §299b-22(a)(3) (West 2013) (noting that PSQIA privilege and 
confidentiality protections do not apply to disclosures made in criminal proceedings, disclosures 
that are expressly permitted, non-identifiable disclosures, disclosures to the Food and Drug 
Administration, or any other exceptions that the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality 
determines at a later date). 
 132.  42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-22(a)-(b).  Patient safety information can become PSWP through 
three distinct paths: (1) information created for and reported to a PSO; (2) information and analysis 
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On January 11, 2009, the Department of Health and Human 
Services promulgated regulations implementing the PSQIA.133  The 
protections afforded by the PSQIA enable all hospitals and health care 
providers to share data within a protected legal environment without the 
threat that the information will be used against it.134  The result of the 
PSQIA is a statutory solution that encourages meaningful peer review 
and improved quality of care, while also serving as the impetus to an 
expanded federal common law peer review privilege.135 
B. The PSQIA Statutory Privilege and Impact on Amendment 7 
The PSQIA creates federal statutory privilege and confidentiality 
protections that shield providers from the unauthorized use and 
disclosure of specific quality and safety information as described 
above.136  The PSQIA comprehensively addresses the following three 
problems in the state peer review protection system: “(1) it creates a 
uniform national system of protections that protects a wide array of 
health care institutions; (2) it encourages sharing information with other 
parties; and (3) it cannot be avoided by filing a claim in federal court.”137  
 
generated by a PSO in the process of generating patient safety activities; and (3) documentation of 
deliberations or analysis of, or the fact of reporting pursuant to, a PSES.  Levy, Mareniss, Iacovelli 
& Howard, supra note 16, at 409.  The language of the PSQIA continues by stating that: 
Nothing in this section shall be construed—(1) to limit the application of other Federal, 
State, or local laws that provide greater privilege or confidentiality protections than the 
privilege and confidentiality protections provided for in this section; (2) to limit, alter, or 
affect the requirements of Federal, State, or local law pertaining to information that is 
not privileged or confidential under this section; (3) except as provided in subsection (i) 
of this section, to alter or affect the implementations of any provision of the HIPAA 
confidentiality regulations or section 1320d-5 of this title (or regulations promulgated 
under such section); (4) to limit the authority of any provider, patient safety organization, 
or other entity to enter into a contract requiring greater confidentiality or delegating 
authority to make a disclosure or use in accordance with this section; (5) as preempting 
or otherwise affecting any State law requiring a provider to report information that is not 
patient safety work product; or (6) to limit, alter, or affect any requirement for reporting 
to the Food and Drug Administration information regarding the safety of a product or 
activity regulated by the Food and Drug Administration.  
42 U.S.C.A. §299b-22(g). 
 133.  Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 70732 (Nov. 21, 2008) 
(codified at 42 C.F.R. part 3).  The summary of the final rules states that the PSQIA “establishes a 
framework by which hospitals, doctors, and other health care providers may voluntarily report 
information to Patient Safety Organizations (PSOs), on a privileged and confidential basis, for the 
aggregation and analysis of patient safety events.”  Id. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  See id. 
 136.  Levy, Mareniss, Iacovelli & Howard, supra note 16, at 414. 
 137.  Id. at 415.  Prior to the PSQIA, the lack of federal peer review privilege enabled 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to circumvent state peer review protections by joining a state claim to a federal 
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Federal courts have recognized that the PSQIA created tightly crafted 
federal privilege and confidentiality protection for PSWP.138  In doing 
so, the PSQIA expressly preempts any state law or constitutional 
provision that is contrary to its provisions, including Amendment 7.139 
Almost all patient safety information reported by hospitals to PSOs 
will come from traditional peer review activities, meaning PSQIA 
protection will shield traditional peer review activities within 
hospitals.140  Thus, Florida hospitals that report peer review materials 
appropriately through a PSO will attain protection for the type of 
documents that Amendment 7 desired to make discoverable.  
Consequently, as Florida courts continue to identify peer review 
documents as public records, more and more hospitals are partnering 
with PSOs and following the PSQIA’s statutory framework to protect 
these documents.141  From a practical perspective, many Florida 
plaintiffs’ attorneys and PSQIA critics opine that hospitals are only 
partnering with PSOs in order to block the public from peer review 
materials.142  While it is too early to have aggregate data on what the 
 
claim filed in federal court.  Id. at 404.  This procedural strategy was employed in Burrows v. 
Redbud Community Hospital, 187 F.R.D. 606 (N.D. Cal. 1998), when the parents of an eleven-
month-old boy, who died after being transferred from the emergency department at Redbud 
Community Hospital to another hospital ninety minutes away, filed an EMTALA action in federal 
court that included state claims of wrongful death and medical malpractice.  Levy, Mareniss, 
Iacovelli & Howard, supra note 16, at 404 (citing Redbud Cmty. Hosp. v. Burrows, 188 F.R.D. 356, 
358 (N.D Cal. 1997)).  When the parents sought discovery of peer review documents related to the 
attending physician’s decision to transfer, the hospital refused to disclose the information citing 
California’s peer review statute for support.  Redbud, 187 F.R.D. at 612.  In an unpublished opinion, 
the Northern District of California determined that California’s peer review statute did not apply in 
this matter because the EMTALA action raised a federal question, and under federal law at the time, 
there was no protection or these materials.  Id. (discussed in Levy, Mareniss, Iacovelli & Howard, 
supra note 16, at 404). 
 138.  Lee Med. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 534-35 (Tenn. 2010).  The court stated that the 
Institute of Medicine’s 2000 report prompted additional congressional debate over medical error 
and provided momentum that served as a catalyst for Congress to enact the PSQIA.  Id.  
 139.  See PSQIA privilege and confidentiality language supra note 132 and accompanying text.  
See also Fancher v. Shields, No. 10-CI-4219 (Jefferson Cir. Ct, Ky. Aug. 16, 2011) (holding that 
there is a clear statement of a Congressional intent that such patient safety communications be 
protected in order to foster openness in the interest of improved patient safety, and thus, the area has 
been preempted by the federal law).   
 140.  Bell, supra note 18, at 772. 
 141.  Christine Jordan Sexton, Fighting to Keep Peer Review Private, FLA. MED. BUS., July 
2009, at 6.  The author states that because the PSQIA trumps Florida state law and the Buster II 
ruling, and because PSOs are specifically designed to allow doctors to share information about 
medical errors without fear of legal discovery, she sees PSOs building momentum in Florida.  Id.   
 142.  Id.  The author quotes medical malpractice attorney Sean Cronin who says, “I’m 
concerned that [hospitals] are setting up legal entities [in the form of PSOs] for the sole purpose of 
keeping information from the public.”  Id. 
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PSQIA has meant to peer review in Florida, the fact that Florida has 
more listed PSOs than any other state suggests that Florida hospitals 
recognize the statutory framework of the PSQIA as a means to re-
introduce meaningful peer review in an effort to improve patient safety 
and quality of care.143 
C.  Overview of Common Law Privilege 
While the PSQIA’s federal statutory protection cloaks qualified 
peer review activities with privilege and confidentiality protection, it 
falls short of protecting peer review activities that fail to satisfy its 
statutory requirements.144  In these instances, protection depends on 
federal common law principles.145  Under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26(b)(1), information that is not privileged is discoverable if 
relevant or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.146  
Assuming a federal question exists, “Federal Rules of Evidence 501 
directs that . . . privileges ‘shall be governed by the principles of 
 
 143.  Florida leads the nation in the number of PSOs, with eight listed on AHRQ’s webpage.  
In total, seventy-seven PSOs in thirty states and the District of Columbia are currently listed by 
AHRQ.  Geographical Director of Patient Safety Organizations, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE 
RESEARCH AND QUALITY, http://www.pso.ahrq.gov/listing/geolist.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2013).  
As an example, Medical Peer Review Resource, LLC (“MPRR”) is a listed PSO in the state of 
Florida.  Id.  Although a national PSO, MPRR’s website has a section devoted to its “Florida Focus” 
which reads:  
Due to the fast growth and interest in the need to improve quality, by finding a way to 
protect peer review, we are particularly working with Florida healthcare providers who 
face a unique issue, Amendment 7, also known as the Patient’s Right to Know 
Amendment.  Amendment 7 raises a serious challenge for Florida hospitals and 
physicians, as previously protected peer review information is subject to greater 
discovery in litigation.  Amendment 7 confers broad rights to obtain records of adverse 
medical incidents.  MPRRs efforts focus on how hospitals and physicians can protect 
this information through our PSO, as instituted by the Patient Safety and Quality 
Improvement Act of 2005 (PSQIA). 
Florida Focus, MED. PEER REVIEW RES., LLC, http://medicalpeerreviewresource.com/florida.php 
(last visited Feb. 10, 2012). 
 144.  See, e.g., Schlegel v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, No. CIV 07-0520 MCE KJM, 2008 
WL 4570619 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2008) (declining to afford PSQIA federal statutory protection 
when there was no indication that the applicable investigations conducted were prepared for and 
reported to a PSO); Massi v. Walgreen Co., No. 3:05-CV-425, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77893, at 
*14-16 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 25, 2006) (recognizing the federal privilege, but ruling that there was 
inadequate showing by the defendant that the information was assembled for purposes of reporting 
to a PSO).  
 145.  See, e.g., Schlegel, 2008 WL 4570619, at *3; Francis v. United States, No. 09 Civ. 
4004(GBD)(KNF), 2011 WL 2224509, at *6 (S.D. N.Y. May 31, 2011); K.D. ex rel. Dieffenbach v. 
United States, 715 F. Supp.2d 587, 595 (D. Del. 2010).   
 146.  Dieffenbach, 715 F. Supp.2d at 591.  Generally, any party asserting privilege bears the 
responsibility of proving the availability of privilege and its applicability.  Id. 
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common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United 
States in light of reason and experience.’”147  This rule is intended to 
afford district courts the “flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a 
case-by-case basis.”148 
The United States Supreme Court decision in Jaffee v. Redmond149 
established the psychotherapist—patient privilege as the most recently 
recognized federal privilege.150  Here, the Jaffee Court concluded that 
the “reason and experience” clause of Federal Evidence Rule 501 
required the psychotherapist–patient privilege be recognized.151  
Articulating its rationale, the Court stated that: “Reason tells us that 
psychotherapists and patients share a unique relationship in which the 
ability to communicate freely without the fear of public disclosure is the 
key to successful treatment.”152  The court continued, stating that “in the 
absence of absolute confidentiality, the practice of psychotherapeutic 
counseling would fail to serve the purpose it is intended for: the 
treatment of patients.”153  Here, it was determined that the sheer 
possibility of disclosure may impede the development of trust and 
confidence essential to successful treatment.154 
In satisfying the “experience” prong, Jaffee noted that all fifty 
states had adopted some form of psychotherapist—patient privilege.155  
Stating that “it is appropriate to treat a consistent body of policy 
determinations by state legislatures as reflecting both ‘reason’ and 
‘experience,’” the Jaffee Court concluded the vast recognition of 
psychotherapist-patient privilege by state legislatures evidenced 
 
 147.  Id. at 591 (citing FED. R. EVID. 501); see also Francis, 2011 WL 2224509, at *5 (quoting 
Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996) (recognizing a psychotherapist-patient privilege)). 
 148.  Francis, 2011 WL 2224509, at *5 (quoting Univ. of Pa. v. E.E.O.C., 493 U.S. 182, 189 
(1990)).   
 149.  518 U.S. 1 (1996). 
 150.  Id. at 1.  In Jaffe, the defendant police officer shot the decedent when the officer believed 
the decedent was about to stab another man.  Id.  Post-incident, the defendant sought counseling.  
Id.  Survivors of the decedent brought a federal suit claiming the decedent’s constitutional rights 
were violated because the officer allegedly used excessive force during the encounter.  Id. at 5.  The 
privilege issue focused on whether the plaintiffs were able to obtain notes and statements taken by 
the officer’s therapist during counseling sessions, or whether the statements and notes were 
protected from compelled disclosure by recognition of a new federal common law psychotherapist-
patient privilege.  Id. at 5.   
 151.  Id. at 2. 
 152.  Id. at 6.  
 153.  Bassler, supra note 15, at 708 (citing Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10). 
 154.  Bassler, supra note 15, at 708 (citing Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 10).  Here, the author compares 
the importance of privilege in the psychotherapist-patient relationship to the importance of privilege 
in a successful attorney-client relationship.  Bassler, supra note 15, at 708. 
 155.  Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 2 
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overwhelming support for expanding the privilege.156  Further, the Court 
noted that a uniform recognition of the privilege is important because the 
participants in the confidential conversation must be able to predict with 
some degree of certainty whether particular discussions will be 
protected; noting that an uncertain privilege is little better than no 
privilege at all.157 
D. An Expanded Peer Review Privilege in Federal Court 
Federal courts have recognized that medical peer review privilege 
furthers federal policy.158  Historically, however, courts have declined to 
recognize a medical peer review privilege for two primary reasons: 
reliance on an inapplicable United States Supreme Court ruling159 and 
Congress’ failure to create a medical peer review privilege when it 
enacted the HCQIA.160 
Focusing on the second rationale, as the Court in KD ex rel. 
Dieffenbach v. U.S161 correctly recognized, the HCQIA no longer 
represents Congress’ final word on medical peer review protection.162  In 
 
 156.  Id. at 14. 
 157.  Id. (citing Upjohn Co. v. U.S., 101 S. Ct. 677, 684 (1923) (“An uncertain privilege, or 
one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little 
better than no privilege at all.”). 
 158.   See, e.g., Francis v. United States, No. 09 Civ. 4004(GBD)(KNF), 2011 WL 2224509, at 
*6 (S.D. N.Y. May 31, 2011) (articulating the primary purpose of privilege is to encourage candor 
among medical staff by shielding the information from disclosure in medical malpractice suits). 
 159.  See Univ. of Pa. v. E.E.O.C., 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990) (holding common-law privilege 
would not be recognized to protect peer review materials from disclosure and insisting that courts 
narrowly construe statutes providing privileges).  This case, however, pertained to a professor’s 
tenure peer review file in an employment discrimination action and does not, and should not, extend 
to peer review documents in medical malpractice actions.  Francis, 2011 WL 2224509, at *6.  “The 
interests at issue in a discrimination claim . . . are different from [those] of a medical malpractice 
case, and merit a different analysis.”  Adkins v. Christie, 488 F.3d 1324, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007).  
“Moreover, recognizing a medical peer review privilege in a civil rights case would not further the 
primary purpose of such a privilege: ‘to encourage candor among medical staff by shielding the 
information from disclosure in medical malpractice suits.’” Francis, 2011 WL 2224509, at *6 
(quoting Singh v. Pocono Med. Ctr., No. 3:09-0439, 2010 WL 2521039, at *3 (M.D. Pa. June 15, 
2010)). 
 160.  See Virmani v. Novant Health Inc., 259 F.3d 284, 292 (4th Cir. 2001) (relying heavily on 
the fact that the legislative history of the HCQIA was silent as to whether Congress considered and 
rejected a federal privilege the court concluded that Congress will create a peer review privilege 
when it is so inclined and did not do so in the HCQIA); Agster v. Maricopa Cnty, 422 F.3d 836, 839 
(9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that Congress had occasion and opportunity to consider the privilege 
and decided not to grant it either explicitly or by implication; therefore the court found a general 
objection for providing a privilege itself). 
 161.  715 F.Supp.2d 587, 595 (D. Del. 2010). 
 162.  Id. (cited in Francis, 2011 WL 2224509, at *6).  Differentiating the PSQIA and HCQIA 
further, unlike HCQIA’s legislative history, “the PSQIA’s legislative history contains frequent 
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its analysis, Dieffenbach stated that the PSQIA “announces a more 
general approval of the medical peer review process and more sweeping 
evidentiary protections for materials used therein.”163 
Furthermore, because the PSQIA promoted a learning environment 
intended to create a “culture of safety” that focuses on information 
sharing, improved patient safety and quality and the prevention of future 
medical care, the Dieffenbach court felt its decision to recognize a 
qualified privilege for confidential and evaluative materials produced in 
the applicable review process was aligned with PSQIA’s intent.164 
Similarly, in Francis v. United States165 the court recognized a 
privilege for medical peer review materials after stating that “in light of 
the broad protection afforded by the PSQIA” the relevant inquiry is 
whether medical peer review privilege would advance Congress’ goal of 
promoting peer review to improve quality care.166  Here, the defendant 
demonstrated to the Court’s satisfaction that private and public interests 
would be served by recognizing a medical peer review privilege because 
“the success of a hospital’s quality assurance review process ‘depends 
upon an atmosphere of confidence.’”167 
These two United States District Court decisions demonstrate that 
the PSQIA has changed courts’ historical position on medical peer 
review privilege and suggests that the United States Supreme Court may 
 
references to expanding peer review protections so that healthcare providers can report medical 
errors without fear of being sued.”  Leaman, supra note 119, at 195 (citing S. REP. NO. 108-196, at 
1-3 (2003) (recognizing that medical errors must be reported, analyzed and corrected in order to 
improve patient safety and the quality of healthcare in the United States).  While a court may 
decline federal peer review confidentiality and privilege protection because Congress failed to 
expressly provide for them in the PSQIA’s statutory language, this is unlikely because Congress has 
expressly stated that even though the words “peer review” do not appear in the PSQIA, the purpose 
of the legislation was to provide peer review protections.  Leaman, supra note 122, at 195-196 
(citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-197, at 11(2005) (emphasizing that the PSQIA provides peer review 
protection of PSWP reported to a PSO). 
 163.  Francis, 2011 WL 2224509, at *6 (quoting Dieffenbach, 715 F. Supp.2d at 595).   
 164.  Dieffenbach, 715 F.Supp.2d at 595.  The court’s recognition of a qualified privilege for 
confidential evaluative materials produced by the pertinent review process was heavily influenced 
by public policy evident in Maryland privilege law and Congress’ intent in passing the PSQIA.  Id. 
at 592.  Although the review body at issue here was not technically a PSO, the court felt it clearly 
performed the same functions that Congress intended the PSQIA to encourage such as monitoring, 
oversight and performing periodic assessments of data quality.  Id. at 596.  Because the pertinent 
review process collected the same kind of safety data enumerated in the PSQIA, within the same 
organizational structure, to accomplish the same goal, the court concluded that it was “confident 
that protecting otherwise confidential and evaluative materials resulting from this process would not 
substantially offend the federal policy announced in the PSQIA.”  Id. at 597. 
 165.  No. 09 Civ. 4004(GBD)(KNF), 2011 WL 2224509 (S.D. N.Y. May 31, 2011). 
 166.  Id. at *6 
 167.  Francis, 2011 WL 2224509, at *5 (quoting Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996)). 
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consider a new expanded common law medical peer review privilege.168 
E. The United States Supreme Court Should Provide a Common Law 
Privilege to Medical Peer Review 
Influenced by the recent United States District Court decisions 
referenced above, the United States Supreme Court should establish a 
common law peer review privilege.  Jaffee provides an analytical 
framework that supports extending a federally recognized privilege to 
medical peer review.169 
First, the absolute confidentiality that the Jaffee Court reasoned was 
imperative to establishing successful psychotherapist–patient 
relationships, is equally important to encouraging meaningful medical 
peer review.170  The Jaffee Court further opined that without protection, 
statements that might have otherwise been relevant to a civil action 
would never have been made by the patient, leaving nothing to discover 
because of fear that disclosures would not be kept confidential.171  
Likewise, if physicians fear that statements made during the peer review 
process are discoverable, it is unlikely that they will participate in peer 
review.172  If physicians do not participate in peer review, the ability to 
accomplish Congress’ goals of significantly reducing medical error is 
compromised.173 
Second, Jaffee noted that recognizing an expanded privilege may be 
appropriate when there is uniform recognition of the privilege among the 
states.174  Dieffenbach and Francis recognized that all fifty States and 
 
 168.  Michael Cassidy, Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act (PSQIA) May Change 
Federal Common Law Privilege, TUCKER ARENSBERG ATTORNEYS MED. LAW BLOG (June 14, 
2010), http://www.medlawblog.com/articles/credentialing-and-peer-review/patient-safety-and-
quality-improvement-act-psqia-may-change-federal-common-law-privilege. 
 169.  See Bassler, supra note 15, at 707. 
 170.  See supra notes 154-154 and accompanying text.   
 171.  See Bassler, supra note 15, at 708.  In support of this point, the court stated: 
In contrast to the significant public and private interests supporting recognition of the 
privilege, the likely evidentiary benefit that would result from the denial of the privilege 
is modest.  If the privilege were rejected, confidential conversations between 
psychotherapists and their patients would surely be chilled, particularly when it is 
obvious that the circumstances that give rise to the need for treatment will probably 
result in litigation.  Without a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which 
litigants such as petitioner seek access-for example, admissions against interest by a 
party-is unlikely to come into being.  This unspoken ‘evidence’ will therefore serve no 
greater truth-seeking function than if it had been spoken and privileged.   
Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 11-12. 
 172.  See Bassler, supra note 15, at 711. 
 173.  See supra notes 58, 116, 122 and accompanying text.   
 174.  See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12.  As the Supreme Court has noted, “any State’s promise of 
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the District of Columbia recognize some form of medical peer review 
privilege.175  Such overwhelming state support was an important factor 
in satisfying Jaffee’s “experience” test, thus providing support that the 
United States Supreme Court will find it appropriate to recognize a 
corresponding federal common law medical peer review privilege.176 
Finally, like the psychotherapist-patient privilege in Jaffee, both 
reason and experience conclude that a medical peer review privilege 
promotes sufficiently important interests that overshadow the need for 
obtaining evidence.177  This fact is solidified by To Err is Human, 
discussed above, which suggests meaningful peer review will help 
prevent as many as 98,000 preventable errors annually, resulting in 
annual savings of as much as $29 billion in national healthcare costs.178  
In light of its role in improving patient safety and quality of care, the 
public interest in promoting peer review continues to be 
“overwhelming.”179 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is a general recognition and acceptance at both the local and 
national level that “(1) meaningful peer review is essential to improving 
healthcare outcomes; (2) that meaningful and effective peer review 
requires candid participation by physicians; and (3) that physician 
participation will be candid only where the details of peer review are 
kept confidential and privileged.”180 
 
confidentiality would have little value if . . . the privilege would not be honored in a federal court.  
Denial of the federal privilege therefore would frustrate the purposes of the state legislation that was 
enacted to foster these confidential communications.”  Id. at 13. 
 175.  K.D. ex rel. Dieffenbach v. United States, 715 F.Supp.2d 587, 592-594 (D. Del. 2010); 
Francis v. United States, No. 09 Civ. 4004(GBD)(KNF), 2011 WL 2224509, at *5-6 (S.D. N.Y. 
May 31, 2011).  “These statutes share a common purpose in encouraging physician candidness by 
eliminating the fear that peer review information will be used against them in subsequent litigation.” 
Dieffenbach, 715 F.Supp. 2d at 594.  Although Florida no longer provides peer review protection 
after Amendment 7, the “experience” test is further supported in this case because Congress has 
explicitly recognized the importance of peer review in the PSQIA.  See Bassler, supra note 15, at 
711. 
 176.  See Francis, 2011 WL 2224509, at *5-6.  Furthermore, while all states provide for certain 
peer review protection, subtle differences in the language of each state’s peer review statutes and 
the underlying public policy associated with each respective statute have led to varying 
interpretations on the scope of state medical peer review protection.  Graham, supra note 58, at 138. 
 177.  See Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 9-10; see also supra notes 115-115 and accompanying text. 
 178.  See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 179.  Brief of the Idaho Hosp. Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 28, 
at *8 (quoting Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc. 50 F.R.D. 249, 251 (D.D.C. 1970) 
 180.  Brief of the Idaho Hosp. Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 28, 
at *9.  These principles have been recognized in state courts across the country.  Id. at *10 (citing as 
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The introduction of the PSQIA re-established the foundation for 
meaningful peer review by providing federal statutory privilege and 
confidentiality protection for peer review materials submitted to a 
PSO.181  Furthermore, multiple federal courts have focused on the intent 
of the PSQIA to recognize an expanded federal peer review privilege, 
decisions that may help serve as the catalyst for the United States 
Supreme Court to consider an expanded federal common law privilege 
for medical peer review.182 
Although potential plaintiffs may feel a greater burden establishing 
medical malpractice claims, the burden is not undue as plaintiffs may 
still obtain necessary records and documents from their own medical 
records to give rise to appropriate actions.183  In scenarios where 
privilege applies, while patients may not have access to adverse medical 
incidents when considering which physician choose, the reductions in 
medical error presumed associated with peer review protection should 
increase the patient’s confidence that treatment will be performed 
without error.184  Therefore, considering the constituents most directly 
affected by federal peer review privilege and confidentiality protection, 
it appears clear that benefits of protection outweigh the risks.185  In 
addition to quality of care improvements, a uniform federal peer review 
privilege would lower transactions costs to hospitals, thereby reducing 
patients’ cost of health care, a critical issue in the United States.186 
 
examples, Konrady v. Oesterling, 149 F.R.D. 592, 595 (D. Minn. 1993) (the goal of peer review is 
the improvement of patient care); Ardisana v. Northwest Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 795 N.E.2d 964, 969 
(Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. 2003) (purpose of statute privileging peer review materials is to advance the 
quality of health care by ensuring that peer review committee members effectively engage in the 
peer-review process); State ex rel. St. Johns Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Dally, 90 S.W.3d 209, 214 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 2002) (“Peer review, the process by which physicians and hospitals evaluate and discipline 
staff doctors, has become an integral component of the health care system in the United States.”). 
 181.  See supra notes 124-135 and accompanying text.  
 182.  See cases discussed supra notes 159-164. 
 183.  Leaman, supra note 124, at 200-201.  PSQIA advocates believe that it strikes an 
important balance “because the PSQIA protections will ease peer review participants’ fears of being 
sued for honestly evaluating their colleagues, while at the same time giving plaintiffs who wish to 
sue for medical malpractice access to the information created at the time of the alleged 
malpractice.”  Id. at 188.  Specifically, the definition of PSWP expressly excludes a patient’s 
medical record.  See Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23, at 90.   
 184.  See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.   
 185.  Leaman, supra note 122, at 200-201.  The author identifies the three primary parties 
influenced by PSQIA federal privilege and confidentiality protections as (1) the physicians that 
participate in peer review; (2) potential plaintiffs who may bring a medical malpractice action; and 
(3) individuals seeking medical care.  Id. at 200.  
 186.  Sullivan & Anderson, supra note 23, at 90.  “Peer review encourages practices that seek 
to avoid preventable adverse events in the first place, thereby reducing costs.”  Id. at 51.  
Additionally, the author argues that a uniform privilege will lead to a uniform body of law which 
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In Florida, the effects of the PSQIA will be uniquely felt because of 
its impact on Amendment 7.187  Hospitals are already restructuring 
internal processes and partnering with PSOs to obtain the available 
statutory PSQIA protections, and a new wave of litigation is now ripe 
for hospitals to challenge Amendment 7 requests utilizing a PSQIA 
defense.188  Florida may not have to look far for the case that will set this 
new direction, as one Florida hospital system is already litigating with 
PSQIA as its principal argument.189  While a federal district court in 
Florida recently agreed to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over the 
hospital’s challenge to Amendment 7, this decision will likely only 
delay, not deter, a case destined for federal court review.190  With 
determined parties and the sustainability of Amendment 7 in the balance 
post-PSQIA, this case and the role it plays in further re-establishing 
meaningful peer review and improving the quality of patient care in 
Florida will be important to watch.191 
 
 
will lower costs associated with attorney fees and insurances premiums, while also reducing the 
overall cost of collecting peer review materials.  Id. at 41, 91. 
 187.  See supra notes 141-143 and accompanying text.  
 188.  See supra notes 123, 140 and accompanying text.  Florida hospitals should be encouraged 
by recent state court decisions in Illinois and Kentucky that have upheld PSQIA protections for 
hospitals that restructured their internal processes to comply with the PSQIA and its PSES 
guidelines.  See The Dep’t of Fin. and Prof’l Regulation v. Walgreen Co., 970 N.E. 2d 552, 557-558 
(Ill. App. 2d, 2012) (finding that the quality improvement reports created by the pharmacy under its 
tracking and reporting system were privileged under the PSQIA when Walgreen’s vice-president 
stated in her affidavit that the pharmacy did not create, maintain, or otherwise have in its possession 
any incident reports other than those quality improvement reports in question that were transmitted 
to its federally certified PSO); Fancher v. Shields, No. 10-CI-4219, (Jefferson Cir. Ct, Ky. Aug. 16, 
2011) (holding that Congress provided for broad confidentiality and legal protections of information 
collected and reported voluntarily to a PSO for the purposes of improving the quality of medical 
care and patient safety).  But see Morgan v. Cmty. Med. Ctr., No. 08 CV 4850, (Pa. D & C.3d, June 
14, 2011) (finding that the hospital failed to meet its burden that the PSQIA protected the incident 
report being sought because it could have been prepared principally for purposes other than those 
that the PSQIA protects). 
 189.  See Complaint, Lee Mem’l Health Sys. v. Guillermo et. al, No. 2:10-cv-00700-CEH-
DNF, 2010 WL 5809357 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 19, 2010).  Stating that the Florida courts have failed to 
conclusively establish the constitutionality of Amendment 7 and its relationship to Florida statutes 
and federal laws, LMHS’ motion seeks a declaration clarifying its rights and obligations under 
Amendment 7 and a determination on the constitutionality of Amendment 7 in relation to the 
PSQIA.  Id. at *5.  In order to meet the statutory requirements of peer review protection afforded by 
the PSQIA, LMHS executed a Patient Safety Organization Professional Services Agreement with 
Medical Peer Review Resource, LLC (“MPRR”) on September 2, 2009 and implemented the LMHS 
Patient Safety Evaluation System to identify, collect, and analyze PSWP for purposes of reporting 
such PSWP to MPRR.  Id. at *15-16.   
 190.  U.S. Court in Florida Will Abstain From Considering Challenge to Florida’s Patients 
Right to Know Amendment, IX HEALTH LAW. WKLY. 47 (Dec. 9, 2011).   
 191.  See id. 
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